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Do Demographics Prevent Consumption Aggregates
From Reecting Micro-Level Preferences?
Abstract
Most simulated micro-founded macro models use solely consumer-demand aggregates
in order to estimate preference parameters of a representative consumer, for use in policy
evaluation. Focusing on dynamic models with time-separable preferences, we show that
aggregation holds if, and only if, momentary utility functions fall in the Identical-Shape
Harmonic Absolute-Risk Aversion (ISHARA) utility class, identifying which parameters of
ISHARA utility functions are allowed to vary over time. Given this theoretical result, it
should be easy to empirically reject the aggregation properties that the macroeconomic
representative-consumer identication approach requires: it su¢ ces to show that permanent
incomes guaranteeing the same living standard across households of di¤erent size violate an
a¢ ne relationship. In order to test the validity of this a¢ ne equation, we develop a vignette
survey that produces appropriate data without demand-estimation restrictions imposed by
models. Surprisingly, in six countries, this equation is not rejected, lending support to using
consumer-demand aggregates.
Keywords: Linear Aggregation, Dynamic Representative Consumer, Generalized
Absolute Equivalence Scale Exactness (GAESE), Equivalent Incomes, Vignette
Survey
JEL classication: C42, E21, D12, E01, D11, D91, D31, I32
1. Introduction
Most simulated micro-founded macro models are combined with aggregate-consumption time
series to estimate economy-wide preference parameters, which are then used in forecasting
and policy evaluation. These models make an implicit aggregation assumption: that the
incentives behind consumption choices are transmitted directly from the micro level to the
macro level and are reected in aggregate consumption uctuations. The strong form of
exact linear aggregation which implies the existence of a representative consumer (RC) is
also used as a working hypothesis in existing macroeconomic studies with heterogeneous
agents to analyze observed consumer choices in a more tractable way.
One study clarifying the tractability of aggregation in the analysis of heterogeneous-agent
models is Caselli and Ventura (2000), which builds on previous ndings of Chatterjee (1994).
This tractability is also the starting point for the compelling review paper by Heathcote,
Storesletten and Violante (2009) regarding the role of household heterogeneity in quantitative
macroeconomics.1 There are concepts of micro-econometric aggregation in which preference
heterogeneity among utility maximizers is combined with specic distributional properties of
consumer characteristics that enter the budget constraint (wealth, income, skill distributions,
etc.; for a review, see Blundell and Stoker, 2005). In this study, we focus on a stricter concept,
namely exact aggregation that does not depend on features of wealth/income distributions at
all. Imposing exact aggregation properties to a heterogeneous-agent model is equivalent to
using particular functional forms for the utility function(s) of households, that guarantee the
existence of an RC: a ctitious agent who is always endowed with the aggregate resources
of a heterogeneous-agent economy and whose choices always coincide with economy-wide
aggregated choices under any price regime and under any underlying distribution of resources
1 In particular, see their section Heterogeneity with complete markets.
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at the individual or household level.2
Since most consumption data are collected at the household level, and since incentives
behind household-consumption choices di¤er for households with more members, it is reason-
able to think that aggregation could fail due solely to household-size heterogeneity. In this
paper, (i) we theoretically identify the comprehensive class of heterogeneous utility functions
that are time-separable and time-varying, and that allow for linear aggregation in dynamic
environments where households have savings options and dynasties change family size over
time; (ii) we devise a test that can empirically identify whether utility functions driving
actual choices belong to the identied aggregation class; (iii) we design a vignette survey
that generates data enabling us to perform the aggregation test without using models and
without demand-estimation restrictions; and (iv) we test the validity of the survey method
itself.
1.1 Aggregation in a dynamic environment
We study dynasties with changing family size that can also accumulate wealth.3 In order
to capture family-size changes, we allow a households momentary objective function to
change over time. Our theory and our empirical tests apply to both collective-bargaining
household analyses of the Mazzocco (2007) type as well as to unitary-household analyses.
The household-level utility functions we analyze can be seen as welfare functions among
2 So, if I is a set of households with di¤erent utility functions U i	
i2I , then aggregation means being able
to use

U i
	
i2I as ingredients for constructing a utility function of RC, i.e. U
RC jfUigi2I , which is maximized
subject to the aggregated economy-wide resource constraints and always replicates aggregated choices by the
community having

U i
	
i2I , when solutions are interior. Section 2 of this paper is devoted to understanding
the necessary and su¢ cient functional properties of

U i
	
i2I that enable the construction of U
RC jfUigi2I .
3 One paper documenting the dramatic family-size changes in the US since the 19th century is Salcedo,
Schoellman and Tertilt (2012, cf. Figure 1, p. 138). We do not accommodate endogenous family formation,
but our results should be useful for that extension. There is a substantial body of macroeconomics litera-
ture that introduces family-formation decisions in dynamic frameworks. See, for example, Aiyagari et al.
(2000), Greenwood and Seshadri (2002), Greenwood et al. (2005), Fernández et al. (2005), Knowles (2013),
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2014), among others.
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household members, irrespective of whether there is within-household bargaining or not.4
Our theoretical contribution is that we provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for ex-
act linear aggregation, for any time-varying momentary utility functions. To our knowledge,
the only linear-aggregation study that allows for time-variant momentary utility functions
is Caselli and Ventura (2000). Yet, Caselli and Ventura (2000) identify one class of utility
functions that is su¢ cient for aggregation, while here we also provide necessary aggregation
conditions that characterize all types of utility functions that lead to exact linear aggre-
gation. The comprehensive class of household objective functions that are consistent with
exact linear aggregation is a generalized class of the Identical-Shape Harmonic-Absolute-
Risk-Aversion (ISHARA) utility function, and of the exponential form in which particular
parameters (subsistence levels or bliss points) are allowed to vary over time and across family
types.
A set of utility functions, fuigi2I , in a community belongs to the same ISHARA class if
absolute risk aversion of a utility function ui (c), with c being consumption, is a harmonic
function

c+ i (t)
 1
, i.e., the coe¢ cient  multiplying consumption is the same for all
i 2 I, and constant over time, while i (t) di¤ers across households and over time.
A key di¤erence in our analysis is that the momentary-utility functions in Mazzocco
(2007) are time-invariant, as Mazzocco (2007) does not allow for demographic changes over
time. Given that Mazzocco (2007) also conducts his analysis in discrete time, there are
similarities with the proofs of Pollak (1971), who nds necessary and su¢ cient aggrega-
tion conditions for static environments with multiple goods when individual utilities are
4 Samuelson (1956, pp. 8-12) explains that the existence problem of non-intersecting social indi¤erence
curves, to which exact Gorman aggregation is a solution (see Samuelson 1956, p. 5), is the same, no matter
if one analyzes aggregation of consumer demands across households or aggregation of consumer demands
among members within a household. The requirement of within-household Pareto e¢ ciency in collective
household models (see, for example, Vermeulen, 2002, pp. 540-3) is central to showing that aggregation
results can be applied to collective household models.
3
additively-separable across di¤erent goods. Our analysis, in contrast, accommodates that
whenever a family anticipates a change in its size, it will incorporate the impact of this
demographic change into the intertemporal Euler equation that governs its savings.5
1.2 Empirical implications
Our aggregation result leads to a testable equation. This equation involves permanent
equivalent incomes (EIs): permanent household incomes that equate the level of material
comfort of individuals living in households of di¤erent size. If utilities belong to the time-
varying ISHARA and exponential family class that we identify as necessary and su¢ cient
for aggregation, then each permanent EI is an a¢ ne transformation of any other household
types permanent EI. These a¢ ne relationships across EIs mean that, once expenditures for
subsistence needs are subtracted from permanent income, then the remainder of permanent
incomes must entail the same benets from within-household sharing of goods for the rich and
for the poor, satisfying the Generalized Equivalence Scale Exactness (GAESE)property
suggested by Donaldson and Pendakur (2006).
1.3 Testing aggregation using static-model Engel curves may be
invalid
In a static framework, aggregation requires that Engel curves are linear and parallel (see
Gorman, 1953, 1955). Most studies reject this linearity (see Blundell and Stoker, 2005, for
an extensive empirical literature review). Yet, falsifying the static-analysis aggregation con-
dition of linear and parallel Engel curves does not mean that corresponding dynamic-analysis
5 Examples of studies that examine only su¢ cient conditions for aggregation in dynamic environments of
consumer choice are Chatterjee (1994), Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), Caselli and Ventura (2000), and Maliar
and Maliar (2001, 2003). A strand of literature numerically examines whether approximate aggregation
holds (see also Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2009) for further discussion). For example, Krusell and
Smith (1998) and Carroll (2000) examine cases of heterogeneity in rates of time preference in incomplete-
markets environments with Carroll (2000) focusing on conditions under which approximate aggregation
fails.
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aggregation conditions would be falsied as well. Dynamic-analysis aggregation conditions
mean that consumption decision rules are linear and parallel in wealth and permanent in-
come. The dynamic aggregation conditions nest the static aggregation conditions because
the static conditions do not control for wealth, life-cycle e¤ects or anticipations about future
changes in tastes due to demographic heterogeneity. Thus, an aggregation test with missing
variables may not be valid due to misspecication.
An example of a paper that discusses how misspecication of nested models can lead
to erroneous conclusions is Godfrey (1984). The problem of missing variables may also be
present in the context of semiparametric or nonparametric tests due to missing variables.
Cherchye et al. (2013) suggest an alternative aggregation test to testing for linear and
parallel Engel curves, again in a static-model context, without considering anticipations of
future income or demographic changes. Missing-variable problems may therefore apply to
this test as well.
1.4 Addressing the need for additional data in dynamic-analysis
aggregation
Testing the dynamic aggregation condition requires information on permanent EIs. Such
household-type-specic EIs are not available in existing databases, as one needs models and
identication restrictions in order to derive EIs. For this reason, we collect information
relating permanent income to household demographic composition using a vignette survey
introduced by Koulovatianos et al. (2005, 2009). Our database consists of a nationally
representative survey from Germany, and several pilot surveys conducted in France, Cyprus,
China, India, and Botswana. In these surveys, di¤erent household compositions are described
in short vignettes.
In the vignette survey, respondents are asked to assess permanent EIs for di¤erent house-
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hold compositions relative to a one-member household with given levels of permanent in-
comes, known as reference incomes (RI). Specically, we ask respondents: What is the
net monthly household income that would allow a household with two adults and one child
to attain the same level of material comfort as a net monthly income of $2,000 for a one-
member household In this example, the amount of $2,000 is the RI, and the response is
the EI specic to that household type. RIs are drawn from the top to bottom of a countrys
personal income distributions. This EI data allows us to test for aggregation.
1.5 Test results
The dynamic aggregation condition requires that respondentspermanent EI assessments
are a linear function of RI. In the representative survey, one out of ve RIs is randomly
assigned to each respondent. Hence, for any given household composition, all permanent
EI assessments come from di¤erent respondents: respondent groups evaluating di¤erent RI
levels are mutually independent. Because of this independence it should be easy to break
dynamic aggregation. Yet, the EI assessments of all ve independent respondent groups fall
into a straight line. This nonrejection of aggregation holds for all seven of the household-
composition types we investigate.
We also report evidence of nonrejection of the a¢ ne equation relating EIs using pilot
data from six dissimilar countries (Germany, France, Cyprus, China, India, and Botswana).
Although the respondent groups evaluating each RI were not independent in these small
pilot samples, in all 49 cases we examine, aggregation is not rejected, supporting the results
from the large German survey.
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1.6 Usefulness of aggregation for policy analysis
Our results are encouraging for macroeconomists who use aggregative models. Furthermore,
they have a message for welfare and policymaking analysis, too. Most policies are likely
to change both resource allocations and price patterns. Exact linear aggregation does not
require any assumptions regarding the distribution of resources, nor does it impose any
price-pattern restrictions. As Gorman (1953, 1955) prove, linear aggregation coincides with
the requirement of non-intersecting social indi¤erence curves.6 Thus, every time one changes
policies in markets with properties that are far from exact linear aggregation, welfare and
policy evaluation problems emerge due to potentially intersecting social indi¤erence curves.
2. Theoretical Results on Multidimensional Heterogeneity and
the Existence of a Representative Consumer
In this section, we fully characterize the class of utility functions of heterogeneous house-
holds that leads to the existence of a representative consumer: a ctitious consumer whose
preferences represent an entire community-preference prole (the set of utility functions of
all household types) and whose choices always coincide with actual aggregated choices under
any price regime. The question we pose is: How much heterogeneity in household objective
functions can the representative consumer survive?
There is compelling theoretical work on the topic of aggregation and we can mention
only a few key advances here. For a set of heterogeneous households that live for one period
and decide once and for all about the consumption of di¤erent consumer goods, Gorman
(1953) shows that the indi¤erence curves of a representative consumer are non-intersecting
6 Specically, Kirman (1992, p. 123-125) provides graphic representations depicting the (high) possibility
of welfare misrepresentation, and Gorman (1955) o¤ers explicit and intuitive explanations of the problems
arising in the absence of aggregation. One of the most comprehensive treatments of this welfare misrepre-
sentation is in Jerison (1994).
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if, and only if, Engel curves for all traded commodities are always linear and parallel across
all households for any given price regime. In a later study Gorman (1961) shows that, for
Engel curves to be linear and parallel, utility functions must meet a particular functional
property. Based on this property, Pollak (1971) o¤ers a complete characterization of the
set of utility functions of households that allow the existence of a representative consumer,
under the assumption that all utility functions are additively separable with respect to each
di¤erent good. Concerning households that act for more than one period, in particular those
that are innitely-lived dynasties, previous work focuses on households that consume a single
composite consumer basket and accumulate nancial wealth over time: Chatterjee (1994)
and Caselli and Ventura (2000) identify household utility functions that are su¢ cient for
the existence of a representative consumer. Here we extend their work by showing the set
of utility functions that is also necessary for the existence of a representative consumer.
Focusing on dynasties with changing demographic composition, Theorem 1 proves neces-
sary and su¢ cient conditions for aggregation in the context of a community with households
having time-variant momentary utility functions. Theorem 1 identies which parameters
of the resulting ISHARA utility functions are allowed to vary over time and which para-
meters are not allowed to vary over time, which is a novel result and the main theoretical
contribution of this paper.
The proof of Theorem 1 is tedious and it relies on arguments we developed for the proof
of Theorem A.1, which appears in Online Appendix A. Theorem A.1 refers to momentary
utility functions that do not change over time, and it states that exact linear aggregation
holds if, and only if, utility functions fall in the Identical-Shape Harmonic Absolute-Risk
Aversion (ISHARA) utility class. Mazzocco (2007) provides a similar result to Theorem A.1
in a discrete-time framework, relying on previous proofs provided by Pollak (1971). Here we
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study aggregation in continuous time, which requires a di¤erent approach for establishing
and proving Theorem A.1. Our continuous-time approach is most useful for introducing
heterogeneous rates of time preference in Theorem 1, which is one reason we place Theorem
A.1 in Online Appendix A. Another reason for linking Theorem A.1 to this paper is that it
results from weaker conditions and it is directly related to our empirical tests.
2.1 Economic environment
Time is continuous and the time horizon is innite, t 2 [0;1). Households are all innitely
lived and belong to a constant set I of di¤erent types, with generic element i. The set of
household types can be countable, nite, or a continuum. It may also be that all households
are of the same type and, regardless, there is a largenumber of households, meaning that
an individual household has a negligible impact on the aggregate economy, i.e., all households
are price-takers. Belonging to type i does not mean a xed demographic type over time in
the application of this paper. Instead, belonging to type i at time t = 0 means that there
is a xed exogenously pre-determined future path of changing demographic proles of the
innitely-lived dynasty. Assuming that set I is constant, means that we do not have entry
and exit of other dynasties after time 0.
Assume a measure  : I ! [0; 1], with density, d, having the property,
inf fd (i) j i 2 I g > 0 , (1)
i.e., if I is nite, d (i) > 0 for all i 2 I, whereas if I is a compact interval, d (i) is
continuous on I and bounded away from 0. Households of di¤erent types can di¤er with
respect to their initial endowment of capital claims (assets) and also with respect to their
labor productivity, which is given by the exogenous function of time, i : R+ ! R+. Asset
holdings for household i 2 I at time 0 are denoted as ai0.
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We assume that a community preference prole given by a set of utility functions, (U i)i2I ,
is xed, while within a preference group i 2 I, there can be many individuals with heteroge-
neous initial endowments, aj0, and labor-productivity functions, 
j. Instead of distinguishing
individuals across groups through a multi-dimensional measure (e.g., ~ (i; j), where i de-
notes the utility group and j denotes a single household unit with
 
aj0; 
j

), we resort to the
reduced notation recommended above.
There is a single composite consumable good, c. We examine the case in which individ-
ual rates of time preference have a consumption-choice-independent part that is common
across households, and a consumption-choice-dependent part implied by their momentary
utility function.7 In particular, consumer preferences of each i 2 I are given by the general
additively-separable utility function, which implies heterogeneous rates of time preference,
U i
 
ci (t)

t0

=
Z 1
0
e 
R t
0 ()dui
 
ci (t) ; t

dt , (2)
with  : R+ ! R++.
Note that rates of time preference are a-priori heterogeneous and habit formation can be
accommodated by our model. In equation (2), the functional form
R1
0
e 
R t
0 ()dui (ci (t) ; t) dt
could have also been expressed as
R1
0
vi (ci (t) ; t) dt. We do not express momentary utility
as vi (ci (t) ; t), because at any t  0 we want the rate of time preference to be equal to,
 v
i
12 (c
i (t) ; t)
vi1 (c
i (t) ; t)
=  (t)  u
i
12 (c
i (t) ; t)
ui1 (c
i (t) ; t)
. (3)
The above equation shows that the rate of time preference is additively separable into a
choice-independent ( (t)) and a choice-dependent component ( ui12=ui1). This formulation
o¤ers convenience in constructing asymptotically convergent paths of the present value of
consumption in our proofs.
7 Koulovatianos (2005, Theorem 2) provides an analysis of a class of utility functions that allows for het-
erogeneous choice-independent rates of time preference. The necessary class of utility functions allowing for
linear aggregation is very restricted: it consists of utility functions with constant absolute risk aversion.
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We make the following technical assumptions:
Assumption 1 For all i 2 I, and all t  0, ui : R2+ ! R, is twice-continuously
di¤erentiable with respect to c, once continuously di¤erentiable with respect to t,
and such that ui1 (c; t) > 0 and u
i
11 (c; t) < 0 on some interval, Ci (t)  R+, with
ui1 (c; t) <1,  1 < ui11 (c; t),  1 < ui12 (c; t) <1 for all c 2 Ci (t)  R+, with
ci (t)  inf (Ci (t)) < sup (Ci (t))  ci (t).
Assumption 1 ensures that, for all i 2 I, and all t  0, there is a choice domain,
Ci (t)  R+, which is an interval, and also that standard desirable properties of momentary
utility functions are present. Assumption 2 allows households to choose consumption paths
such that, asymptotically, the consumption level is non-decreasing.
Assumption 2
R1
0
e 
R t
0 ()ddt <1 .
The momentary time endowment is normalized to one, without loss of generality: all
adults in the household work full time, and if a household is larger, with more than one
working adult, personal labor incomes within the household can be summed up and the
households total labor income can be used instead.
For any given price vector (r (t) ; w (t))t0 >> 0, with r (t) being the interest rate and
w (t) the labor wage per unit of time at each instant, the budget constraint faced by household
i 2 I is,
_ai (t) = r (t) ai (t) + i (t)w (t)  ci (t) , (4)
for all t  0, ( _x (t)  dx (t) =dt for any variable x) and the transversality condition is,
lim
t!1
e 
R t
0 r()dai (t) = 0 . (5)
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We dene the domains of wealth- and productivity heterogeneity at any given price vector
for which the existence of a representative consumer is conceptually relevant. That is the
domain that guarantees interiority of solutions to each individual optimization problem. The
following assumption states this formally.
Assumption 3 Given a community preference prole captured by the collec-
tion of functions (ui)i2I and , the domain of, (i) initial distribution of assets
(ai0)i2I, (ii) the collection of labor-productivity functions
 
i

i2I, and (iii) prices
(r (t) ; w (t))t0, is restricted so that the optimization problems of all households
i 2 I are well-dened, and the solution to each individual problem is interior for
all t  0.
Given Assumption 3, maximizing (2) subject to constraints (4) and (5) for any given ai0
is an optimal-control problem with necessary optimality conditions given by,
_ci (t) =   u
i
1 (c
i (t) ; t)
ui11 (c
i (t) ; t)
[r (t)   (t)] , (6)
that, together with (4) and (5), lead to decision rules of the form,
ci (t) = Ci

ai (t) ; t
  r () ; w () ; i ()
t

. (7)
Equation (7) implies that consumption rules at each moment are memoryless, depending
only on current personal assets as well as current and future prices. Assumptions 1 and 3
have a particular connection that is revealed by equation (6). The term   u
i
1(ci(t);t)
ui11(c
i(t);t)
must
always be well-dened in order to have interiority. Thus, to meet Assumption 3 (interior
solutions), it is necessary that ci (t) 2 Ci (t), for all t  0, and all i 2 I.
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Denition 1 Given a community preference prole captured by the collection of
functions (ui)i2I , and , complying with Assumptions 1 and 2, a representative
consumer (denoted by RC) is a (ctitious) consumer who has time-separable
preferences,
R1
0
vRC (c (t) ; t) dt, with vRC1 (c; t) ; v
RC
11 (c; t) and v
RC
12 (c; t) existing,
and with 0 < vRC1 (c; t) < 1 and  1 < vRC11 (c; t) ; vRC12 (c; t) well-dened for all
consumption levels, c 2 CRC  c 2 R+ c = RI cid (i) , ci 2 Ci, i 2 I	, for
all t  0, and who possesses the economy-wide aggregate wealth and productivity
at all times, and whose demand functions coincide with the aggregate demand
function of the economy at all times, namely,
cRC (t) = CRC
 Z
I
ai (t) d (i) ; t


r () ; w () ;
Z
I
i () d (i)

t
!
=
=
Z
I
Ci

ai (t) ; t
  r () ; w () ; i ()
t

d (i) , (8)
for all t  0, for the complete domain of prices (r (t) ; w (t))t0, initial dis-
tributions of assets, (ai0)i2I, and functions
 
i : R+ ! R

i2I that comply with
Assumption 3.
This is a rather strong representative-consumer concept: it focuses on solving a single
households optimization problem using standard optimal-control techniques, in order to
derive aggregate demands at any point in time.8 Our nal two assumptions place a weak
8 Our aggregation concept di¤ers from the aggregation concept used by Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005),
where Pareto weights are used to construct the objective of a representative agent. Our goal is to examine
conditions on the community preference prole that are necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of social
preferences (representative-consumer preferences) consistent with the independence axiom of Koopmans
(1960): if two di¤erent intertemporal paths have a common outcome at a certain point in time, preferences
over these two paths should always, and solely, be determined by comparing them with remaining outcomes
that di¤er at that particular date. In other words, the focus of our analysis is to characterize community
preference proles where social preferences are time-separable and where, at each separate point in time,
non-intersecting social indi¤erence curves exist.
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constraint on the scope of preference heterogeneity. We assume that nobodys bliss point
(if any) should be lower than or equal to anyone elses subsistence level of consumption
(if any), hence \
i2I
Ci (t) is an interval. Since the consumable good is considered to be a
composite good (a consumer basket), Assumptions 4 and 5 convey this point, and are not
unreasonably restrictive (notice that if a function f : R ! R is strictly decreasing, and if
[a; b] is an interval, then by f ([a; b]) we denote the interval [f (b) ; f (a)]).
Assumption 4 For all i 2 I, \
t0
ui1 (Ci (t) ; t) is non-empty and not a singleton.
Assumption 5 For any i 2 I, let,
Ci 

c 2 \
t0
Ci (t)
 \t0ui1  Ci (t) ; t is non-empty and not a singleton

.
Then, \
i2I
Ci is non-empty and not a singleton.
Based on these assumptions, Theorem 1 states our aggregation result.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1 through 5, a representative consumer exists
if and only if
ui (c; t) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
[c+i(t)]
1  1 1
(1  1)
or
 e  1iG(t) c
with  > 0 and i (t) 2 R or  < 0 and i (t) > 0
with i > 0
,
(9)
for all i 2 I, with functions i (t) such that Assumptions 4 and 5 are met.
The representative consumer has utility
URC
 
(c (t))t0

=
Z 1
0
e 
R t
0 ()duRC (c (t) ; t) dt , (10)
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with,
uRC (c; t) =
8><>:
[c+RC(t)]
1  1 1
(1  1)
 e  1RCG(t) c
for  6= 0 , RC (t) = RI i (t) d (i)
else, RC =
R
I id (i)
. (11)
Proof Theorem 1 See Appendix Proofs. 
The message conveyed by Theorem 1 (and the additional insight to Theorem A.1 in On-
line Appendix A) is that parameter  is not only common across all household types, but also
 cannot vary over time. This result is in perfect agreement with Jackson and Yariv (2015),
who stress the impossibility of having a representative consumer if parameter  is hetero-
geneous across agents. The only utility parameters that can vary over time are subsistence
levels (or bliss points) i (t). As long as i (t) varies with time for some i 2 I, preferences
given by (9) imply that rates of time preference are heterogeneous. As long as i (t) 6= 0 for
some i 2 I and some t  0, elasticities of intertemporal substitution are heterogeneous as
well. Yet exact linear aggregation applies. While Theorem 1 is precise about the functional
forms that allow for aggregation, it does not o¤er a precise characterization of the trajecto-
ries of parameters
 
i (t)

t0

i2I
. The trajectories of these parameters are free, subject to
our interiority assumptions regarding each households optimization problem. Also notice
that if utility functions are of the exponential form, then i (t) =i (0) = j (t) =j (0) for all
i; j 2 I, a restriction that does not hold for all other utility functions of Theorem 1.
The consumption decision rules of all household types, i 2 I, are of the form,
ci (t) = b (t) ai (t) +  i (t) ,
i.e., they are always linear in wealth, ai (t), and parallel across all households. Carroll
and Kimball (1996) show that if labor income uncertainty is introduced, the consumption
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function becomes concave. Nevertheless, the class of preferences we identify promotes a linear
shape for the consumption function, at least when wealth is su¢ ciently far from borrowing
constraints.
As rates of time preference are given by equation (3), they can be heterogeneous. If
i (t) 6= 0, then elasticities of intertemporal substitution, [1  i (t) =c], can also be hetero-
geneous. These two aspects of heterogeneity are in line with a large body of heterogeneous-
agent literature in macroeconomics and household nance. These features characterize the
extended ISHARA utility class identied by Theorem 1.
2.1.1 How static and dynamic aggregation analyses di¤er
The distinction between static and dynamic aggregation analysis has implications for the
empirical testing of aggregation. Static-model demand aggregation coincides with linear
and parallel Engel curves. The consumption decision in a static model would be of the form
ci = bi0+ b1y
i, and parallel Engel curves would require that b1 is common across households,
while bi0 would be allowed to vary across households.
9 In the dynamic model we do not have
just Engel curves but decision rules involving wealth and future income anticipation. Our
decision rules are of the form (see explicit formulas (28) and (29) in the Appendix),
ci (t) = bi0

t j  i ()
t

+ b1 (t) y
i (t) + b2 (t) a
i (t) + bi3

t j  yi ()
>t

. (12)
The decision rule given by (12) is linear in yi (t)  i (t)w (t), and with a common-across-
households coe¢ cient b1 (t) at time t (note that b1 (t) can also vary over time). But it
includes household wealth, a variable that is usually missing from household microdatabases
and it also contains two time-varying coe¢ cients, bi0

t j  i ()
t

and bi3
 
t j (yi ())>t

.
9 In a static framework c refers to a consumer-item category, while in our dynamic model we have the
comprehensive consumer basket (c can be seen as a di¤erent good at di¤erent future times). Variable y is
the income ow.
16
The latter depends on future income expectations and di¤ers across individuals; the former
depends on anticipated changes in household preferences, e.g., due to anticipated changes
in household size. Apparently, a static-analysis Engel curve given by ci = bi0 + b1y
i, is
nested in equation (12). Failing to control su¢ ciently for wealth, life-cycle e¤ects, future-
income expectations, and anticipated future taste changes due to demographic heterogeneity
may lead to an erroneous rejection of actual linearity between consumption categories and
current income. Indeed, in a dynamic empirical analysis, Calvet and Comon (2003) report
evidence that failing to account for taste heterogeneity can lead to imprecise conclusions
about relationships between budget shares and income.
2.2 Application to household-size heterogeneity and the necessity
of the linear relationship across EIs
If individuals have utility from the class presented in Theorems 1 and A.1 (Online Appen-
dix), then these two theorems imply that, whenever such individuals form multi-member
households, the objective function of household members can be merged into a single utility
function of the representative household member. That utility function will be of the same
functional form but with a di¤erent parameter i (t), and rescaled to capture the change in
household size.
Following a standard assumption in the literature, assume (i) that  (t) =  for all t; and
(ii) that households of the same size also have the same utility function. If a representative
consumer exists, then utility functions should fall in the class given by Theorem 1. Focusing
on the case where r (t) = r =  for all t, and with w (t) = w, and i (t) = i for all t, a
steady-state condition for all households, (6) and (4) imply that
ci = rai + w
i
= yi , (13)
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where yi is the permanent income of household i in the steady state.10 Moreover, we assume
that each household type stays the same forever, with i (t) = i, for all t  0, when
preferences of Theorem A.1 apply. With i (t) = i, for all t  0, the model referring
to Theorem 1 collapses to the model of Theorem A.1. The interpretation of the model
of Theorem 1 is the case where a dynasty is shifting from one household type to another
over time, keeping smoothness of such transitions so as to comply with Assumption 1. On
such a permanent-income trajectory, the lifetime utility of a household is
R1
0
e tui (yi) dt =
ui (yi) =. We dene a set of permanent equivalent incomes, denoted by yE, of households
belonging to any two di¤erent family types i; j 2 I, as incomes that equate lifetime utilities,
ui (yi) = = uj (yj) =, i.e. any pair
 
yiE; y
j
E

, i; j 2 I, that solves
ui
 
yiE

= uj
 
yjE

. (14)
Proposition 1 below provides a result that holds under the above steady-state conditions.
Proposition 1 Let all households of the same size have the same utility function.
If r (t) = r =  for all t  0, and all household types receive their permanent
incomes yi for all i 2 I. Then if each household type stays the same forever,
with i (t) = i, for all t  0, the existence of a representative consumer implies
that for all i; j 2 I,
yjE = i;j +  i;jy
i
E , (15)
for some i;j 2 R, and  i;j > 0.
Proof See Appendix Proofs. 
10In the empirical analysis below it can be seen that in asking respondents about vignette average permanent
monthly incomes, we designed our survey questionnaire to approximate the above steady-state conditions
where households consume their average permanent incomes.
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In words, equation (15) means that if all household types are in a zero-growth steady
state where they receive their permanent income, then household-size economies entailed in
discretionary incomes (income minus subsistence needs) are the same across the rich and
the poor.
As mentioned above, in this case, where households are in a zero-growth steady state
(r (t) = r = ), and are receiving their permanent income, they optimally choose to spend
their discretionary income at every instant of time. For some , equation (15) can be re-
written as
yj     i;j =  i;j

yi      1
 i;j
i;j

,
where  is to be identied empirically and it will specify subsistence needs for the two types.
In our empirical analysis in the next section we nd that if i in the last equation above is
a one-member household, then i;j > 0 in all cases. That i;j > 0 in all cases where j is
a multi-member household implies subsistence needs that increase as household members
are added to the household and it motivates the assumption that  > 1 (each household
has non-trivial subsistence needs). In the above equation,  i;j measures the economies of
household size achieved by discretionary incomes across household types i and j, and the
equation implies that these are the same for the rich and the poor.
Corollary 1 is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1, which we state without proof.
Corollary 1 Empirically falsifying equation (15), falsies the existence of a rep-
resentative consumer in the strict linear-aggregation sense proposed by Gorman
(1953).
Throughout the rest of this paper, we claim that equation (15) is testable; we demonstrate
how it can be tested; and we subject it to scrutiny.
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3. Empirical Analysis
Equation (15) in Proposition 1 says that the existence of a representative consumer requires
that household-size economies entailed in permanent equivalent incomes, after subtracting
subsistence needs, are the same across the rich and the poor. Empirically testing (15) requires
data on EIs. Identifying EIs from observed choices, i.e. demand data, has long occupied
researchers.11 Most researchers use demand systems to impose a theoretical framework
for identifying EIs. Their works share a common feature: identication assumptions must
be imposed. Examples of such identication assumptions are independence of base, or
generalized (absolute) equivalence scale exactness. Imposing an identication assumption
means to postulate a particular relationship for EI functions. For example, Lewbel (1989)
and Blackorby and Donaldson (1993) assume a special case of (15), where i;j = 0, in order
to identify EIs, while Donaldson and Pendakur (2006) impose (15) in their estimation. Yet
these assumptions are a-priori untestable. In order to sidestep the challenges involved in
testing for ISHARA using actual consumption data, we designed a vignette survey in which
we ask respondents to provide their own assessments of EIs for a set of household types.
3.1 Overview of survey design
Our vignette survey of a representative sample of the German population consists of two
main parts (our questionnaire appears in Online Appendix E). Part A pre-assigns a net
monthly income for a one-member household, a reference income (RI), and asks respondents
to state EIs for seven other household types. Each respondent is randomly assigned one
of ve di¤erent RIs. RIs are drawn from the top to bottom of a countrys personal income
11A key step for inequality measurement is to convert available household-income data of multimember
households into incomes that are equivalent to the income of a one-member household. In this way the
distribution of living standards across individuals can be measured from an observed distribution of household
incomes.
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distributions (see Online Appendix B for details). The question asked is of the following
type: What net monthly household income would allow a household with two adults and
one child to attain the same level of material comfort as a net monthly income of $2,000 for
a one-member household? What income would one need if, instead, there were two children
in the household?12
Part A relies on the idea that respondents are experienced at recognizing the connection
between a households demographic composition and the level of material comfort that in-
come can buy for its members. In this sense, respondents are real-life expertsin assessing
EIs. Pooling diverse insights of a large number of respondents may correct potential biases
of a single expert. Yet respondents must have su¢ cient information to assess EIs for house-
holds with a demographic composition and a level of material comfort that di¤er from their
own actual experiences. Otherwise, estimates of EI may su¤er from limited information bias
(LIB). In order to test for LIB, we use a large sample that is representative with respect to
the income dimension and that oversamples household types that are scarce in the overall
population (e.g., single parents with two or more children).
Moreover, respondents should demonstrate su¢ cient understanding in answering the
question about assessing EIs. To test for this crucial aspect of survey e¤ectiveness, our
survey instrument is equipped with a tool that tests whether people mean what they say.13
In particular, Part B asks an assessment question that is equivalent to the one in Part A, us-
ing di¤erent means of representation to cross-check for consistency: Likert-scale evaluations
of material comfort (for an example of Likert-scale evaluations, see Kahneman et al., 2004).
12Here we use material comfort or living standard, as measured by the goods, services, and luxuries available
to an individual or group, which should be distinguished from the concept of overall life satisfaction used in
Kahneman and Krueger (2006) and Kahneman et al. (2006). In addition, we frame our questionnaires using
monthly incomes instead of annual incomes, because in all countries examined, income is communicated or
measured in terms of monthly salaries.
13See, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) for a discussion of the validity of respondent data in
surveys.
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The question asked is: Consider that the net monthly household income of a household
with two adults and one child is $5,500. State a number from 1 to 100 that best charac-
terizes the level of material comfort of this household, given that 10is very bad,50is
su¢ cient,and 90is very good.Respondents receive such a question for the one-member
household and the seven household types of Part A. Household incomes provided in Part B
were obtained through a previous pilot study in Germany using the same RIs as in Part A.14
If a respondent states a Likert-scale value for a household type with pre-assigned income Y
that is higher than what she/he stated for the one-member household with the RI in Part
B, then, in Part A, this respondent should have stated an EI for that household type that
is lower than Y .
3.2 Using our vignette-survey data for the aggregation test
The aggregation condition given by equation (15) involves permanent incomes. The intention
of the survey is to ask respondents to imagine a stationary environment in which the net
income of a household is constant, r (t) =  (t) for all t, and a households size is the same
forever. To the extent that such conditioning to a stationary hypothetical environment
is achieved, RI should be a proxy of the permanent income of a one-member household
(OMH), yOMH . Our working hypothesis is that, in Part A of the survey, respondents provide
constant levels of monthly household income streams that bring households with alternative
demographic composition to the same level of material comfort as the OMH with a given RI.
In other words, Part A asks respondents to give a proxy of a permanent EI, yE. Empirically
relating our EI estimates to RIs is then equivalent to empirically relating permanent incomes,
yOMH and yiE for any household-type i.
In order to validate our test, there is an additional working hypothesis and underlying
14The previous pilot study produced the German data used in Koulovatianos et al. (2005).
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assumption: respondents think of a fairly constant and similar across respondents long-term
interest rate, in order to convert streams of income into permanent equivalent incomes re-
ferring to the hypothetical situations they evaluate. Yet, in the survey we do not mention
interest rates, or pre-existing stocks of wealth of the hypothetical households, ai, or savings
plans, or even potential future demographic changes. The vignettes do not mention such
details because every survey optimally requires some economy of survey instructions. Vi-
gnette surveys provide a simplied description of the world in order to keep the cognitive
burden of the respondents in limits. In this sense, there is always a trade-o¤ between the
researchers aim to provide a complete and precise description of the environment, and the
need to provide a task that is comprehensible to the survey participants. Certainly, some
respondents may deviate from the utilized economy of survey instructions, and di¤erent
respondents may imagine di¤erent situations regarding pre-accumulated wealth or future
savings or demographic plans of the hypothetical households they evaluate. Nevertheless,
our test of equation (15) focuses on examining di¤erences across rich and poor hypothetical
households. As long as there are no systematic di¤erences in how the surveys questions
are interpreted for hypothetical low versus high incomes, such deviations should not create
problems for our tests.
Whether surveys provide accurate information is open to debate and economists seem to
be more critical than researchers from other disciplines. Potential issues that may a¤ect the
way people respond are framing, anchoring, interviewer e¤ects, and the hypothetic nature
of the survey (see, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Through careful design
one hopes to minimize biases resulting from the survey limitations mentioned above. Most
importantly, in order to avoid framing e¤ects, each respondent in our main survey was
provided only one reference income, which, in addition, was randomly assigned. Further, to
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avoid interviewer e¤ects and biases from social desirability that arises if respondents want
to provide politically correct answers to an in-person interviewer, the survey was carried out
in anonymous form.
Furthermore, in sections that follow below, we examine whether respondents provide
consistent answers on the material comfort of di¤erent household types. This involves two
tests. One test is on whether the same respondent gives consistent answers when the same
evaluation task is represented/framed di¤erently. The second test is on whether respondents
with background characteristics that are similar to those provided in the vignette, respond
di¤erently from respondents whose characteristics di¤er.
Inherent in the nature of hypothetical vignette surveys like ours, however, is the lack of
a mechanism that ensures that respondents have an interest to provide credible information.
Such mechanisms are used in laboratory experiments, for example, in assessments of risk
preferences by means of lotteries; or in willingness-to-pay surveys by means of revelation
mechanisms. We do not see a reason why respondents in the vignette survey should have an
incentive to give biased answers, and we do not see how the data could be gathered in such
an incentive-compatible framework.15
3.3 Survey samples
In our empirical analysis, we use a large sample of 2,042 respondents from Germany collected
in 2006. This large sample comes from across Germany and is representatively sampled
along the dimension of household incomes. In order to secure su¢ cient power of LIB tests,
we over-sampled single parents with two or more children. The intended over-representation
of respondents having children contributed considerably to the high percentage of female
15We thank two anonymous referees for asking us to elaborate on the potential limitations of vignette surveys
and on how our survey design addresses the desired empirical test.
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respondents.16
Previously to conducting this large German survey we ran six pilot studies in countries as
di¤erent as Botswana, China, Cyprus, France, Germany, and India. There is a key di¤erence
in survey design between the large German survey and the six pilot surveys. In the large
German survey, in Part A, each respondent was asked to provide EIs for seven household
types, all referring to the a single randomly selected RI (out of ve available RIs). In the six
pilot studies, each respondent was asked to do the same, but for all ve RIs. That is, in the
pilot studies, each respondent provided 35 EI assessments in total.17 This is a reason why
the sample sizes of our pilot surveys (ranging from 130 to 223 respondents) are su¢ cient for
testing.18
3.4 The raw data support aggregation
The scatter plots of uncontrolled (raw) responses in Part A of the representative-sample
survey appear in Figure 1. Each panel refers to a household type distinguished by its
demographic composition. On the horizontal axis of each panel is the one-member household
RI (ve xed levels that are exogenously determined in the questionnaire amounts are in
2006 euros). Against these xed RIs, we plot the survey responses about EIs. In each
panel there are 2,042 scatter points, each corresponding to a response from each of our
2,042 respondents. Since each panel contains one EI assessment by each respondent, all
EI assessments for particular household types are independent. Independence secures that
aggregation tests are not invalidated by framing or anchoring e¤ects.19
Each panel in Figure 1 suggests an a¢ ne relationship between EI and RI, as suggested by
16Details about data collection and personal characteristics of respondents appear in Online Appendix B.
17The only exception is Botswana, where three instead of ve RIs were provided (see Online Appendix B
for details).
18In addition, the pilot surveys do not include part B of the questionnaire.
19On the possibility of anchoring e¤ects, see Koulovatianos et al. (2007, Section 6).
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equation (15): for all seven household types, a sixth-degree polynomial least-squares curve
(solid line) is hardly distinguishable from a linear t (dashed line). Only for the fourth RI
(EUR 2,750) does the polynomial t indicate a slight deviation downwards. In brief, Figure
1 suggests that ve independent groups of respondents seem to place their assessments of EIs
on a straight line for seven di¤erent household types, on average.
The a¢ ne relationship among EIs is also present in all pilot studies appearing in Figures
2 and 3 (raw responses again).20 In all panels of Figures 2 and 3 the sixth-degree polynomial
t is visually close to a line. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in our pilot studies, each
respondent provided assessments for all ve RIs for each household type. Thus, in each
panel of Figures 2 and 3 one respondent (per country) has provided ve scatter points (EI
assessments), one for each RI.
Regarding our pilot surveys, an objection may be raised concerning the validity of our
tests about a¢ ne relationship (15). If each respondent follows an a¢ ne rule of thumb in
providing EI assessments, the average picture in each country may be a result of framing: re-
spondents may be lazy in thinking and perhaps follow an a¢ ne rule of thumb that dominates
the total picture. For this reason, in the large-scale German survey each respondent assesses
EIs for a single (randomly assigned) RI. Further, the large-scale survey collects data that
allow for assessing whether respondents mean what they say. We devote the remainder of
this section to providing formal tests of (15), and of the e¤ectiveness of our survey method.
20The structure of Figures 2 and 3 is the same as that in Figure 1, with the sole di¤erence that we have
merged scatter plots from three countries in each gure and that we present only sixth-degree polynomial ts
(and not linear ts as is the case with the dashed lines appearing in Figure 1). For inter-country comparisons
all amounts appearing in Figures 2 and 3 are in purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted euros for Germany
in the year 2006.
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3.5 Regression analysis
3.5.1 Regression model and results
Our regression model for the large survey from Germany is,
EShi = f
h (RIi) + b
h
0RI_Dummiesi + b
h
1NLSE
h
i + b
h
2LIBh;i + b
h
3LIBmc;i
+bh4 (LIBh;i  LIBmc;i) + bh5Personal_Characteristicsi + "hi , (16)
where
fh (RI) = ah +
bh
RI
. (17)
The dependent variable is dened as EShi = EI
h
i =RIi, where EI
h
i is the EI stated by
respondent i about household type h, given that respondent i was asked to state EIs using
a one-member household with RI equal to RIi as a benchmark.21 The term "hi is the error
term. Using the specication of equation (16) we jointly run the following tests:
(i) An aggregation/linearity test, using the combination of fh (RIi) and a set of
reference-income dummies, RI_Dummiesi.
(ii) A test of whether people mean what they say, exploring the consistency
between responses from the surveys Parts A and B, using the variable NLSEhi
which describes Likert-scale evaluations.
(iii) A test of limited-information bias (LIB), using a set of LIB dummies LIBh;i
and LIBmc;i
(iv) The dependence of responses of respondent personal characteristics, captured
by a set of variables named Personal_Characteristicsi.
Denitions and roles of all conditioning variables in equation (16) appear below.
21An EI divided by RI is an equivalence scale (ES), a normalization following the convention in the literature
on equivalence scales which is innocuous for the test procedure.
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Aggregation test The function fh (RIi) given by (17) in equation (16) complies with
(15). Variable RI_Dummiesi tests the a¢ ne relationship (15). This is a set that includes
three dummy variables related to RIi, the RI assigned to respondent i in Part A. If, for
example, the RI equal to EUR 2,000 is included in this set, then the RI_Dummy(=EUR
2,000) takes the value of 1 for all respondents who where assigned RI equal to 2,000 EUR,
and 0 otherwise.
The conditioning set RI_Dummiesi is the instrument for conducting the specication
test for any candidate function fh (RI): if there is any variation left unexplained by the
a¢ ne relationship (15) that is now transformed into (17) in regression (16), then it should
be captured by RI_Dummiesi; so a test of exclusion of RI_Dummiesi reveals whether
fh (RI) satisfactorily captures the dependence of ESs on RI. Since the function fh (RIi)
is perfectly correlated with four income dummies and a constant, we only use three RI
dummies in the set RI_Dummiesi, in order to avoid perfect collinearity.
In Table 1, most of these RI dummy variables are insignicant. Only the RI dummy
variable at RI = EUR 2,750 is signicant (based on t-tests), but it suggests only a small
deviation from the a¢ ne relationship (15). The exclusion tests concerning all three RI
dummy variables have moderately low F-test statistics. None of these tests rejects exclusion
with a condence level of 99% or more. In sum, given how tough this test of exclusion is,
equation (17) gives a reasonable specication for fh (RI), which has meaningful intuition.
Coe¢ cient bh in (17) can be interpreted as xed costs of consumption, in addition to the
xed costs of the one-member household. The constant ah in equation (17) is a measure of
household size economies after controlling for the presence of household-type-specic xed
costs of consumption. As household income increases, xed costs become a smaller share of
the households budget. In other words, ES is a decreasing function of RI.
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Testing whether people mean what they say In this section, we address the e¤ec-
tiveness of the vignettes in Part A, namely if the respondents have understood the survey
question and provided credible information. To test the e¤ectiveness of the vignettes, Part
B posed an assessment problem equivalent to the one in Part A that, however, uses di¤erent
means of representation, and thus allows to cross-check for consistency of participantsre-
sponses: Likert-scale evaluations of material comfort. Suppose Part B provided a reference
income of 1000 EURO for the one-member household and 2000 EURO for a couple with
one child, and the respondent had answered 20 Likert points for the former and 15 Likert
points for the latter household. In other words, (s)he believes that the couple with one child
requires more than the stated income to attain the same living standard as the one-member
household. Consistency of a survey participants responses between Parts A and B requires
that she should have stated an equivalent income for the couple with one child that is higher
than 2000 EUR. Hence there should be a negative relationship between equivalent incomes
and Likert-scale evaluations.
The inclusion of variable NLSEhi in our regressions undertakes this task of testing this
negative relationship between equivalent incomes and Likert-scal evaluations. The acronym
NLSE stands for Normalized Likert Scale Evaluationand the NLSE value of respondent i
for a household type h is given by NLSEhi = ln
 
Lhi =L

i

, where Lhi denotes respondent is
stated Likert-scale value for household type h, and Li denotes the Likert-scale value given
by the same respondent, i, for the one-member household in Part B of the questionnaire.
If the sign of bh1 corresponding to NLSE in regression (16) is negative, then such evidence
conrms a necessary condition behind the hypothesis: that respondents understand the main
evaluation task in Part A. Moreover, the estimator of bh1 may control for some respondents
deviant opinions about, for example, the cost of partners or children, so a test of exclusion of
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the NLSE in the regression provides information about the possible presence of such deviant
evaluations.22
As in Part A, in Part B each respondent was provided with a randomly assigned RI
plus seven EIs corresponding to that particular RI (see Online Appendix E for details).
The RIs in Part A are assigned independently from those assigned in Part B. This feature
avoids the possibility that the NLSE is spuriously correlated with the dependent variable
in the regression analysis.23 The NLSE uses the stated Likert-scale value assessing the
living standard of the one-member household as a benchmark, and measures the deviation
of each other Likert-scale value stated by the same respondent from this benchmark. In
Online Appendix C, we provide evidence that the NLSE is e¤ective in suppressing noise
from heterogeneity in respondent perceptions of verbal characterizations.24
In Table 1 we can see that all NLSE coe¢ cients have a negative sign and all tests of
exclusion are rejected (P<0.001). These ndings support the e¤ectiveness of the survey
method. Moreover, the size of all NLSE coe¢ cients is small, indicating that respondents
deviant opinions about household-size economies do not a¤ect the estimators of coe¢ cients
of equation (17) to a large extent.
22See Pollak and Wales (1979) for concerns about consumer choices and fertility preferences. For exam-
ple, biases stemming from any possible dislike for children by respondents may be corrected by including
NLSE, which o¤ers a way to deal with the critique by Pollak and Wales (1979) about conditional vs.
unconditionalequivalence scales.
23Spurious correlation may result from having the same respondent focus on the same level of material
comfort in the evaluations in Parts A and B: some respondents may consciously attempt to provide consistent
responses between Parts A and B, instead of focusing on the evaluation question in each part.
24Heterogeneity in respondentsperceptions of words is formally dened and tested in Online Appendix C.
Kahneman and Krueger (2006, pp. 19-21) discuss this issue and propose a technique for coping with this
problem in an analysis that uses Likert scales on verbal descriptions of well being (although, as we explained
above, the concept of well being used in our survey is material comfort instead of happiness). Similar
concerns are also discussed in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). In Online Appendix C, we present evidence
on how our NLSE variable deals with this problem of stated Likert scale evaluations by respondents.
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Testing whether respondents have limited-information bias To test for LIB, an-
swers from respondents who state an EI for the household type and/or living standard that
is the same as their own are distinguished from answers where this is not the case. In our re-
gression analysis, LIB is tested through control variables LIBh;i, LIBmc;i, (LIBh;i  LIBmc;i).
Let respondent i belong to household type h and let Yi be the disposable household income
of respondent i. From responses to Part A, we calculate ve average EIs for household type
h, each corresponding to an RI. We identify the average EI for household type h that is
closest to Yi. This identied average EI corresponds to an RI that should give the same
level of material comfort for the one-member household. If this particular RI coincides with
the RI that was randomly assigned to i in Part A, then i provided an EI for hypothetical
households with material comforts close to his/her own. We use this identication procedure
to create the dummy variables,
LIBmc;i = 1 if respondent is material comfort is closest to the material comfort
of the one-member household, based on the RI that respondent i evaluated in
Part A; 0 otherwise; and
LIBh;i = 1 if respondent i belongs to household type h, and the dependent
variable in the regression refers to household type h; 0 otherwise.
Variables LIBh;i, LIBmc;i, and the product LIBh;i  LIBmc;i, serve as conditioning vari-
ables in the regression analysis of the stated EIs from Part A, and test for LIB.25 A coe¢ cient
t-student test and a test of exclusion of each of these three variables test LIB. If none of bh2 ,
bh3 , and b
h
4 , is signicantly di¤erent from zero, then LIB does not prevent respondents from
25Table B4 in Online Appendix B shows the household-type distribution of respondents who are included
in the LIBmc;i dummy variable. This is a total of 415 respondents, the sum of the entries in the rst
column of Table B4. Each entry in the rst column of Table B4 shows the number of respondents in the
(LIBh;i  LIBmc;i) dummy variable for each household type. Apart from single-adult households with two or
three children, LIB tests based on the (LIBh;i  LIBmc;i) dummy variable have su¢ cient statistical power.
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e¤ectively performing the evaluation task of Part A. Table 1 shows that only two out of 21
dummy variables related to testing LIB are signicant, but with small coe¢ cients. Only one
exclusion test is rejected (P<0.01) for the household type with two adults and one child.
These ndings o¤er supporting evidence that respondentsown household type and/or level
of material comfort do not bias their assessments of EIs in Part A.
Testing whether personal characteristics of respondents a¤ect their answers
Personal_Characteristicsi is a set of conditioning variables referring to personal character-
istics of the respondents. A coe¢ cient t-student test and a test of exclusion of each of these
variables indicate whether any characteristics of the respondents a¤ect their assessments of
EI. With two exceptions, Table 2 shows that respondentspersonal characteristics do not
appear statistically signicant in the regressions. Respondents living in the new(former
East German) Laender report slightly higher equivalence scales (ESs). This is consistent
with the ndings of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) regarding di¤erences in opinions
between East and West Germans. More educated respondents also state slightly higher ESs
for hypothetical household types with children. More educated parents probably encourage
their children to pursue higher education. All signicant coe¢ cients are small.
Explanatory power of the regressions The regressions t the data quite well; they
explain 30-54% of the total variation of stated ESs. Small standard errors for coe¢ cients
ah and bh in equation (17) indicate a broad consensus across respondents concerning the
evaluation task of Part A.
Testing the a¢ ne relationship (15) using the six pilot surveys As we discuss above,
Figures 2 and 3 support the a¢ ne relationship given by (15) as well. Table 3 presents speci-
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cation tests based on seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) and the inclusion of dummies
around the linear functional form having the same structure as in the regression model
(16). The reason we use SUR regressions for the pilot surveys is a key di¤erence: unlike
the representative-sample survey in Germany, in the pilot surveys, for each family type, the
same respondent provides ve EI evaluations. So, in the pilot surveys the error terms across
the seven family types might be cross-correlated. This can generate a loss in the e¢ ciency
of estimators and can weaken the condence in our specication tests. As seen in Table 3,
with the highest value of the F-test statistic being 1.75, in all 42 cases examined, the a¢ ne
relationship given by (15) is not rejected.
4. Potential limitations of survey data
The main survey of this paper followed the state of the art in terms of vignette-survey
design.26 The sample is representative and randomly drawn, the understandability of the
vignettes was pre-tested in pilot surveys, the tasks provided are manageable in a reasonable
amount of time to limit cognitive burdens, anonymity was guaranteed to prevent respon-
dents from feeling obliged to provide politically correctanswers, and for avoiding framing
(anchoring), each respondent was provided with only one randomly drawn reference income
to evaluate. In addition, the previous section presented tests for cognitive e¢ ciency, limited
information bias, and potential biases by respondent personal characteristics. None of these
tests provide evidence in favor of such biases.
Nevertheless, nobody can read respondentsminds, and nobody can guarantee that par-
ticipants respond perfectly in line with what the vignettes seek to elicit: to provide equivalent
incomes appropriate for testing equation (15). In particular, it is not easy to guarantee that
26A recent study containing useful references regarding vignette surveys that use the terms stated-preference
analysisand hypothetical choice analysisis Delavande and Manski (2015).
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respondents do not imagine savings plans of the hypothetical households, or that respon-
dents ignore that children may move in or out, or that marriages get dissolved. They may
also have di¤erent perceptions of dimensions that have not been explicitly dened in the
vignettes (e.g., the number of hours worked). Yet, even if such vignette-paradigm deviations
are present, it is di¢ cult to think of a specic source of bias that invalidates the tests of
equation (15). This would require that the deviations are systematically related to the ma-
terial living standards described in the vignettes. In sum, while we cannot formally prove
that our survey provides valid information on equivalent incomes, all our tests are in favor
of the e¤ectiveness of the survey, and we do not see an alternative available dataset suited
for rigorous testing of aggregation.
5. Applications
We see three potential applications of our ndings. First, is the use of a representative-
consumer utility function for aggregative (representative-agent models). Second, is the use
of the class of preferences with heterogeneous household sizes in partial-equilibrium analyses
of cross-sectional data. Third, is the use of the identied class of heterogeneous preferences
in heterogeneous-agent general-equilibrium models.
Regarding the rst application, this of aggregative macroeconomic models, we check
whether our survey estimates imply unreasonable quantitative restrictions on the momentary
utility function of the representative consumer. Using our estimates from Table 1 and data
from the 2003 German Income and Expenditure Survey, the momentary utility function of
the German representative consumer in 2003 is given by,
uRC (c; t = 2003) =
 
c+ 14:91

 OMH   EUR 3; 281
1  1
   1
1  1

, (18)
where  is a free calibrating parameter,  OMH= is the subsistence consumption of a
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one-member household, and the amount is in 2003 euros.27 So, the vector of parameters
 = (; OMH), gives two degrees of freedom for calibrating models.
The logarithmic utility case, which is the special case of (18) with  = 1, is not supported
by our estimates of Tables 1 and 3.28 In the proof of Proposition 1 we show that, for the
logarithmic case, equation (15) holds under the restriction  ij = 1 for all di¤erent household
types (i 6= j, see equation (32) in the Appendix). The constants of the regressions appearing
in Tables 1 and 3 correspond to  i;OMH . These estimates of  i;OMH are typically di¤erent
from 1, and also change across di¤erent household types (i.e.  i;OMH 6=  j;OMH for i 6= j).
The case of exponential utility is not rejected by our data (see equation (38) in the
Appendix). Assuming that all German households have exponential utility, according to our
estimates of Table 1, in Online Appendix D, we prove that the momentary utility function
of the German representative consumer in 2003 is given by,
uRC (c; t = 2003) =  e  114:91OMH c , (19)
where OMH is the only free calibrating parameter in equation (19).
Returning to the functional form of equation (18) with  6= 1, the observation that all
intercepts in Figure 1 are strictly positive supports the existence of subsistence consump-
tion. In business-cycle applications, it is known that having a representative consumer with
constant subsistence consumption over time is not consistent with having balanced growth,
which is convenient for detrending business-cycle models.29 There exist modications to
equation (18) that can serve as remedies for this inability to detrend models. One is to pick
a vector of parameters  = (; OMH) so that OMH = EUR 3; 281=14:91  a, and to keep
27See Online Appendix D for the derivation of (18). In an aggregative model that uses the utility function
given by (18), the appropriate measure of aggregate income to use is one-member-household equivalent
income. In Online Appendix D we present how we construct the distribution of one-member-household
equivalent incomes using data from the 2003 German Income and Expenditure Survey.
28We thank an anonymous referee for noticing this inconsistency of the logarithmic case.
29See, for example, King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988, 2002).
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doing this for every year, in order to eliminate the subsistence level from the representative
consumers utility function, a standard assumption in the literature. Another is to allow for
a subsistence consumption level, but to let this subsistence level grow at the same rate as to-
tal factor productivity. An alternative remedy is to introduce an external habit, multiplying
the value of OMH , making the function u
RC (c; t) explicitly dynamic, in a way consistent
with a balanced-growth path.
The second potential application is this of tting cross-sectional data through partial-
equilibrium models. Using a vector of parameters  = (; OMH) with ; OMH > 0, two
papers that use the implications of subsistence consumption in order to explain cross-sections
of micro data (household-portfolio choices) are Achury et al. (2012) and Hubar et al. (2014).
Alternatively, our survey data can be combined with econometrically estimated demand
systems in the fashion of Lewbel (1989) or Donaldson and Pendakur (2006). Survey based
EIs are a complementary goodness-of-t criterion to existing data.
Given the potential of our analysis to address both macro and micro data, our EI esti-
mates can aid the third potential application: the calibration of heterogeneous-agent models
in the fashion of Aiyagari (1994), Krusell and Smith (1998), or Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions,
and Moll (2015). As we show, exact linear aggregation can be consistent with heteroge-
neous rates of time preference and elasticities of intertemporal substitution. So, we are
condent that there is exibility for both matching cross-sectional micro data features and
for studying heterogenous-agent macroeconomic implications. Certainly, studying market
incompleteness, borrowing constraints, and other nonconvexities, oblige us to assume ap-
proximate aggregation. Nevertheless, with preferences from the class shown in Theorem 1,
approximate aggregation properties are di¢ cult to get rid of.30
30We thank Dirk Krueger for explaining this point to us in his formal discussion of an earlier version of this
paper.
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6. Conclusion
Aggregation is of central importance to micro-founded macro models that rely on estimation
based on macro aggregates alone. Here we provided aggregation results that pertain to a
dynamic representative consumer with savings options and dynasties with changing family
size over time. Specically, we provided necessary and su¢ cient conditions for aggregation
encompassing heterogeneity in (i) initial wealth; (ii) current and anticipated future income;
and (iii) current and anticipated future household demographic composition.
These aggregation results suggest that the aggregation-testing agenda is still open to
further research. In particular, empirical analyses framed by static models that reject the
Gorman requirement of linear and parallel Engel curves may su¤er from misspecication due
to missing variables. If households are forward-looking, expectations of future events, such
as changes in household income or composition, may impact their present consumer choices.
If these expectations are not adequately modeled, empirical tests may not be valid.
We introduced household-size heterogeneity in a dynamic environment with savings pos-
sibilities and potentially changing household size over time. As we showed, in order to falsify
aggregation, it su¢ ces to empirically reject a single a¢ ne equation relating permanent in-
comes that retain living standards across households with di¤erent size. This a¢ ne equation
means that once expenditures for subsistence needs are subtracted from permanent income,
the remainder of permanent incomes must entail the same household-size economies for the
rich and for the poor. We tested the validity of this equation without a-priori assumptions or
conditioning on a model. We have not performed tests of linear consumption decision rules.
Our tests focused on the additional aggregation requirements introduced by household-size
heterogeneity.
We produced survey data from a large sample of respondents in Germany, both testing the
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critical equation for falsifying the representative consumer concept and also demonstrating
the e¤ectiveness of our survey instrument. In the context of our aggregation tests, ve
independent groups of respondents evaluated household-size economies of rich vs. poor
households, with each single respondent evaluating a di¤erent level of living standard. The
average assessments of these ve independent groups of respondents fall into a straight line, as
required for exact linear aggregation. In seven demanding tests, aggregation is not falsied,
at least not with high condence in marginal cases. In 42 more tests, using pilot data from
six countries in which every respondent evaluates all levels of living standards, aggregation
is never falsied, providing supporting evidence. Although our results do not prove the
existence of a representative consumer, our ndings o¤er external empirical validation that
household-size heterogeneity may not hinder consumer-demand aggregation properties.
Crucial for the aggregation tests is that our estimates of household-size economies are
valid. While we nd supportive evidence that this is the case, we cannot give a formal
empirical proof, an issue that holds for (vignette) survey data in general. Nevertheless, we
do not see an alternative available dataset that is better suited for the aggregation testing
undertaken in the present study.
Our results do not mean that heterogeneity does not matter. Heterogeneity matters,
and it should be modeled. Yet, our results suggest that the job of analyzing the role of
heterogeneity in models is likely to be simpler than initially thought since our empirical
tests advocate the presence of approximate aggregation. Specically, using utility functions
similar to those suggested by Krusell and Smith (1998) in models, adding perhaps time-
varying subsistence or habit expressions to consumption in Gorman-type momentary utility
seems to be the correct direction to follow. Most importantly, models exhibiting approximate
aggregation a-la Krusell and Smith (1998) possess welfare-analysis properties that allow
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for a reliable comparison among alternative policies, providing a useful platform for policy
prescription (see Gorman, 1955, and Jerison, 1994).
An extension would be to examine aggregation conditions using non-time-separable util-
ity. For example, it may be that utility implying habit persistence, in some functional forms
similar to those proposed by Constantinides (1990), might be both su¢ cient and necessary
for aggregation, and it is interesting to examine whether equation (15) is also an implica-
tion of aggregation. Being more specic about habit formation formulations than allowing
for time-varying utility functions is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Improved
survey instruments in future work may reveal more about the structure of utility that un-
derlies observed consumer choices. It may also prove fruitful to combine survey data with
observed choices. Survey data can add another goodness-of-t criterion for estimating pref-
erence parameters, especially for multimember households, irrespective of whether there is
within-household bargaining or not.
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Appendix Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
Part 1: Necessity
Fix any function  : R+ ! R++, and any collection (ui)i2I , with properties complying
with Assumptions 1 through 5. Assume that a representative consumer exists with some
momentary utility function vRC : CRCR+ ! R, of the form vRC (c (t) ; t), at each point in
time.
Considering any i 2 I, its optimality conditions imply that,
 u
i
11 (c
i (t) ; t)
ui1 (c
i (t) ; t)
_ci (t)  u
i
12 (c
i (t) ; t)
ui1 (c
i (t) ; t)
= r (t)   (t) , t  0 . (20)
Now pick r (t) =  (t) for all t  0, substitute it to (20) and take the indenite integral
with respect to time to get,
ui1
 
ci (t) ; t

=  , t  0 . (21)
where  is some constant. Due to the fact that ui11 (c
i (t) ; t) < 0, and due to Assumptions
4 and 5, there is always a  > 0 such that ci (t) 2 Ci (t) for all t  0, satisfying (21). For
r (t) =  (t), (20) implies that,
_ci (t) =  u
i
12 (c
i (t) ; t)
ui11 (c
i (t) ; t)
. (22)
The level of  in (21) will be uniquely identied by setting ui1 (c
i (0) ; 0) =  and applying
equation (6) in Online Appendix A at time 0, combined with the dynamics of ci (t) implied by
(22). Due to Assumption 4, such an interior path exists on Ci, as Ci is dened in Assumption
5. This means that with the right choices of initial wealth and labor productivity, we can
construct interior paths that span Ci. Moreover, always for the case where r (t) =  (t) for
all t  0, due to Assumption 5, for any i 2 I, we can generate any choice of c 2 \
i2I
Ci at
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any point in time, picking the appropriate initial wealth and labor productivity, since the
dynamics of consumption are solely driven by (22).
With this facility at hand, we can look at the problem of the representative consumer,
whose optimal Euler equation gives,
 v
RC
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 R
I c
i (t) d (i) ; t

vRC1
 R
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i (t) d (i) ; t
 Z
I
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i (t) d (i) ; t

vRC1
 R
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i (t) d (i) ; t
 = r (t) , t  0 , (23)
and combining it with (20), it is,
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Setting r (t) =  (t) for all t  0, (24) becomes,
vRC1
 R
I c
i (t) d (i) ; t

vRC11
 R
I c
i (t) d (i) ; t
 (t) + vRC12  RI ci (t) d (i) ; t
vRC1
 R
I c
i (t) d (i) ; t
 = Z
i2I
ui12 (c
i (t) ; t)
ui11 (c
i (t) ; t)
d (i) . (25)
But since, as explained above, for the case where r (t) =  (t) for all t  0, one can gen-
erate any distribution of consumption choices, (25) holds for the whole domain implied by
Assumption 3. So, substituting (25) into (24), it is,
vRC1
 R
I c
i (t) d (i) ; t

vRC11
 R
I c
i (t) d (i) ; t
 = Z
i2I
ui1 (c
i (t) ; t)
ui11 (c
i (t) ; t)
d (i) , (26)
for the whole domain implied by Assumption 3, including the case where r (t) =  (t) for
all t  0. But then, for any t  0, the same argument that was developed in step 2 of the
necessity part of the proof of Theorem A.1 in Online Appendix A, to get,
ui1(c;t)
ui11(c;t)
=  (t) c+ i (t) , and,
vRC1 (c;t)
vRC11 (c;t)
=  (t) c+
R
I 
i (t) d (i) ,
for some  (t) 2 R and some i (t) 2 R, for all i 2 I, t  0
(27)
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Using (27), with the same procedure as in step 3 of the necessity part of Theorem A.1 in
Online Appendix A, candidate utility functions arise. Deriving individual demands, one can
verify that this is possible only if
 (t) =  6= 0 , and i (t) meeting Assumptions 4, 5, t  0 ,
and
 = 0, i (t) = iG (t) ,
that match the utility functions of the theorem. In particular, for the case where  6= 0,
demands are,
ci (t) =
ai (t) +
R1
t
e 
R 
t r(s)dsi ()w () d + 1

R1
t
e
R 
t [( 1)r(s) (s)]dsi () dR1
t
e
R 
t [( 1)r(s) (s)]dsd
  
i (t)

,
(28)
which are linear with respect to is. On the contrary, the demands for the utility function,
ui (c; t) =  e  1i(t) c ,
are,
ci (t) =
ai (t) +
R1
t
e 
R 
t r(s)dsi ()w () d   R1
t
e 
R 
t r(s)dsi ()
R 
t
[r (s)   (s)] dsdR1
t
e 
R 
t r(s)ds
i()
i(t)
d
,
(29)
which can be linearly aggregated only if 
i(t)
i(0)
= 
j(t)
j(0)
for all i; j 2 I, i.e. only when i (t) =
iG (t), i > 0 for all i 2 I, completing the necessity part.
Part 2: Su¢ ciency
Follows by (28) and (29), observing that, under the statement of the theorem, they are
linear with respect to ais, is and is. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose a representative consumer exists. In the proof of Theorem 1, we show that an
aggregation requirement is given by equation (27). In particular, under all assumptions made
in the statement of Proposition 1, according to which utility functions of each household type
do not change over time, equation (27) implies,
ui11 (c; t)
ui1 (c; t)
=
1
c+ i
. (30)
The derivation of utility functions involves integrating both sides of equation (30) with
respect to c twice. Every time that (30) is integrated, an integration constant is involved.
There are three cases to examine.
In the case where  = 0, after integrating both sides of equation (30) with respect to c
twice, we obtain,
ui (c; t) =  ei  1i c +  . (31)
Under all assumptions made in the statement of Proposition 1, equation (14) holds for all
i; j 2 I, but for the empirical identication of any pair  yiE; yjE, i; j 2 I (for avoiding
indeterminacy), constants added to the functional form (31) cannot be di¤erent across any
two i; j 2 I. On the contrary, parameter i, in (31) can di¤er across i; j 2 I, since i
determines the level of is marginal utility of consumption in relation to the marginal utility
of all other household types. So, combining equations (14) and (31), i.e., setting ui (yiE; t) =
uj
 
yjE; t

, implies,
yjE = j (j   i) +
j
i
yiE , (32)
which is consistent with (15).
In the case where  6= 0, and  6= 1, after integrating both sides of equation (30) with
respect to c twice, we obtain,
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ui (c) = ei
(c+ i)
1  1


 
1  1

 +  . (33)
Under the constraint that constants added to the functional form (33) cannot be di¤erent
across any two i; j 2 I, for enabling the empirical identication of any pair  yiE; yjE, i; j 2 I,
while parameter i can di¤er across i; j 2 I, i 6= j. Equations (14) and (33) imply,
yjE =
e

 1 (i j)i   j

+ e

 1 (i j)yiE , (34)
which is also consistent with (15).
For the case where  = 1, the existence of a representative consumer and empirical
identication of any pair
 
yiE; y
j
E

, i; j 2 I, imply that i = j = 0 for all i; j 2 I. To see
this, suppose, that, to the contrary, for some i; j 2 I, i 6= j, it is i 6= j and also i 6= 0,
without loss of generality. Then ln [ui1 (c)] =   1 ln (c+ i) + i , implies, after setting
 = 1, that
ui1 (c) =
ei
c+ i
. (35)
Integrating (35) with respect to c yields,
ui (c) = ei ln (c+ i) + b , (36)
where b is some constant that is common across all household types. Alternatively, (35) can
be re-written as
ui1 (c) =
1
e ic+ e ii
,
and integrating this last equation with respect to c gives,
ui (c) = ei [ln (c+ i)  i] + b . (37)
Comparing (36) with (37) implies that the constant b must be adjusted for i 2 I, which
contradicts the requirement that any pair
 
yiE; y
j
E

, i; j 2 I, can be uniquely identied by
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data by not allowing household-type-specic constants to be added to utility functions. So,
the only way that (36) and (37) coincide is setting i = 0. Since choice of i is arbitrary, set
i = j = 0 for all i; j 2 I. So, (14) implies
yjE = i   j + yiE , (38)
which is the special case of (34) with i = j = 0 for all i; j 2 I and with  = 1. In fact,
setting  = 1 in (34) directly implies that it can only be i = j = 0 for all i; j 2 I. Since
(38) is also consistent with (15), the proposition is proved. Q.E.D.
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Table 1. Summary of ordinary least squares regressions. Endogenous variable: equivalence scales 
stated by respondents. Number of observations: 2,042. Standard Errors in parentheses. P-values of F-
tests in brackets. *** P<0.001, ** P<0.01, * P<0.05. 
 
 Household type 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults, 
3 children 
Constant 1.06*** (0.03) 
1.12*** 
(0.05) 
1.20*** 
(0.08) 
1.42*** 
(0.06) 
1.44*** 
(0.07) 
1.53*** 
(0.09) 
1.61*** 
(0.11) 
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
269.74*** 
(9.77) 
498.34*** 
(16.28) 
728.85*** 
(23.45) 
329.38*** 
(15.91) 
592.99*** 
(20.81) 
839.25*** 
(27.41) 
1,079.86***
(34.34) 
Dummy reference 
income 1,250 Euros 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Dummy reference 
income 2,000 Euros 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Dummy reference 
income 2,750 Euros 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.02) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.08** 
(0.02) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
Normalized Likert 
scale evaluation 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.10*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.13*** 
(0.02) 
Dummy for same 
household type of 
respondent 
0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.14* 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
Dummy for same 
material comfort of 
respondent 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
Dummy for same 
household type and 
material comfort of 
respondent 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.16* 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.14) 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.53 0.54 0.30 0.46 0.52 0.54 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
2.36 
[0.07] 
3.07* 
[0.03] 
3.29* 
[0.02] 
3.60* 
[0.01] 
3.37* 
[0.02] 
3.45* 
[0.02] 
3.51* 
[0.01] 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of the 
normalized Likert 
scale evaluation 
14.79*** 
[0.00] 
30.79*** 
[0.00] 
37.72*** 
[0.00] 
14.37*** 
[0.00] 
18.90*** 
[0.00] 
24.76*** 
[0.00] 
43.96*** 
[0.00] 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of dummy 
for same household 
type 
2.98 
[0.08] 
0.05 
[0.82] 
1.28 
[0.26] 
0.35 
[0.55] 
0.66 
[0.42] 
0.02 
[0.88] 
0.03 
[0.87] 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of dummy 
for same material 
comfort 
0.31 
[0.58] 
3.06 
[0.08] 
1.79 
[0.18] 
3.09 
[0.08] 
0.30 
[0.85] 
0.96 
[0.33] 
1.28 
[0.26] 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of dummy 
for same household 
type and material 
comfort 
1.96 
[0.16] 
1.96 
[0.16] 
0.01 
[0.91] 
1.21 
[0.27] 
7.56** 
[0.01] 
0.09 
[0.77] 
0.11 
[0.74] 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of ordinary least squares coefficients and F-tests for exclusion referring to personal 
characteristics of respondents. Endogenous variable: equivalence scales stated by respondents. 
Number of observations: 2,042. Standard Errors of coefficients in parentheses. P-values of F-tests in 
brackets. Boldface characters for coefficients that have P-values below 5%.  
*** P<0.001, ** P<0.01, * P<0.05. 
 
Variable 
Values 
1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
Region 1: Former East Germany 
0: Former West Germany 
0.02 (0.01) 0.04* (0.02) 0.05* (0.02)
F=3.11 [0.08] F=4.47 [0.03] F=4.81 [0.03]
Gender 1: female  
0: male 
-0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)
F=0.55 [0.46] F=0.01 [0.92] F=0.00 [0.96]
Education 
1: no degree 
... 
6: compl. tech. school/university
0.01*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
F=13.57 [0.00] F=14.26 [0.00] F=16.89 [0.00]
Self-employed 1: yes 
0: no 
-0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.04) -0.02 (0.07)
F=0.02 [0.90] F=0.00 [0.98] F=0.07 [0.80]
Civil servant 1: yes 
0: no 
0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06)
F=0.26 [0.61] F=0.08 [0.78] F=0.03 [0.87]
Blue-collar 1: yes 
0: no 
-0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04)
F=0.13 [0.72] F=0.53 [0.47] F=0.85 [0.36]
School/higher education  
or training 
1: yes 
0: no 
0.02 (0.05) 0.06 (0.08) 0.07 (0.11)
F=0.20 [0.65] F=0.75 [0.39] F=0.50 [0.48]
Working, other 1: yes 
0: no 
0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.05) 0.05 (0.08)
F=0.01 [0.92] F=0.11 [0.75] F=0.57 [0.45]
Pensioner 1: yes 
0: no 
0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03)
F=0.08 [0.78] F=0.01 [0.92] F=0.04 [0.85]
Unemployed 1: yes 
0: no 
0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04)
F=0.22 [0.64] F=0.01 [0.93] F=0.29 [0.59]
Homemaker 
(Housewife/man) 
1: yes 
0: no 
-0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03)
F=0.85 [0.36] F=1.17 [0.28] F=1.00 [0.32]
Obligatory military /  
public service 
1: yes 
0: no 
0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04) 0.02 (0.06)
F=1.93 [0.17] F=0.67 [0.41] F=0.10 [0.75]
Non-working, other 1: yes 
0: no 
0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.06)
F=1.88 [0.17] F=1.18 [0.28] F=0.38 [0.54]
Number of adults in the  
respondent’s household 1: one adult 2: two adults  
0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
F=0.08 [0.78] F=0.08 [0.78] F=0.60 [0.44]
Number of children in the  
respondent’s household 
0: no children 
… 
3: three or more children  
0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
F=1.10 [0.30] F=2.61 [0.11] F=3.67 [0.06]
Family after-tax income 1: lowest income class 
… 
10: highest income class 
0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01)
F=0.06 [0.81] F=0.04 [0.84] F=0.01 [0.93]
Age 
Age of respondent in years 
-0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
F=0.53 [0.47] F=0.08 [0.77] F=0.04 [0.85]
 
Table 2 (continued).  
 
Variable 
Values 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Region 1: Former East Germany 
0: Former West Germany 
0.04* (0.02) 0.06* (0.02) 0.08** (0.03) 0.10** (0.04)
F=5.33 [0.02] F=6.42 [0.01] F=8.40 [0.00] F=7.34 [0.01]
Gender 1: female  
0: male 
-0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04)
F=0.55 [0.46] F=0.21 [0.64] F=0.11 [0.74] F=0.05 [0.83]
Education 1: no degree 
…. 
6: compl. tech. School  
or university 
0.01 (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
F=2.54 [0.11] F=7.52 [0.01] F=6.88 [0.01] F=7.54 [0.01]
Self-employed 1: yes 
0: no 
0.05 (0.05) 0.04 (0.08) 0.00 (0.10) -0.03 (0.12)
F=0.85 [0.36] F=0.31 [0.58] F=0.00 [0.97] F=0.07 [0.80]
Civil servant 1: yes 
0: no 
-0.02 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06) 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.09)
F=0.11 [0.74] F=0.06 [0.81] F=0.00 [0.98] F=0.00 [0.96]
Blue-collar 1: yes 
0: no 
-0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04) -0.05 (0.05) -0.08 (0.06)
F=0.06 [0.80] F=0.11 [0.74] F=0.99 [0.32] F=1.73 [0.19]
School/higher 
education or training 
1: yes 
0: no 
-0.03 (0.08) 0.06 (0.13) 0.12 (0.15) 0.12 (0.16)
F=0.13 [0.72] F=0.38 [0.54] F=1.04 [0.31] F=0.71 [0.40]
Working, other 1: yes 
0: no 
0.04 (0.05) 0.06 (0.07) 0.08 (0.10) 0.11 (0.12)
F=0.56 [0.45] F=1.03 [0.31] F=1.17 [0.28] F=1.38 [0.24]
Pensioner 1: yes 
0: no 
0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.05)
F=0.05 [0.82] F=0.08 [0.78] F=0.18 [0.67] F=0.01 [0.92]
Unemployed 1: yes 
0: no 
-0.05 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) -0.07 (0.05) -0.06 (0.07)
F=2.77 [0.10] F=1.21 [0.27] F=1.86 [0.17] F=1.02 [0.31]
Homemaker 
(Housewife/man) 
1: yes 
0: no 
-0.03 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) -0.05 (0.04) -0.06 (0.04)
F=1.80 [0.18] F=1.82 [0.18] F=1.91 [0.17] F=1.83 [0.18]
Obligatory military /  
public service 
1: yes 
0: no 
-0.01 (0.04) -0.03 (0.05) -0.01 (0.07) -0.01 (0.08)
F=0.07 [0.79] F=0.44 [0.51] F=0.05 [0.82] F=0.04 [0.84]
Non-working, other 1: yes 
0: no 
-0.06 (0.04) -0.04 (0.05) -0.05 (0.06) -0.07 (0.08)
F=2.00 [0.16] F=0.66 [0.42] F=0.63 [0.43] F=0.82 [0.37]
Number of adults in the  
respondent’s 
household 
1: one adult 
2: two adults  
0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04)
F=0.31 [0.58] F=0.20 [0.65] F=0.01 [0.93] F=0.03 [0.85]
Number of children in 
the respondent’s 
household 
0: no children 
… 
3: three or more children  
-0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
F=0.69 [0.41] F=0.77 [0.38] F=0.00 [0.95] F=0.23 [0.63]
Family after-tax 
income 
1: lowest income class 
… 
10: highest income class 
-0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
F=0.12 [0.73] F=0.05 [0.83] F=0.02 [0.89] F=0.00 [0.98]
Age 
Age of respondent in years -0.00* (0.00) -0.00* (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
F=5.20 [0.02] F=4.83 [0.03] F=2.86 [0.09] F=2.53 [0.11]
 
Table 3. Summary of seemingly unrelated regressions. Endogenous variable: equivalence scales 
stated by respondents. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values of F-tests in brackets.  
*** P<0.001, ** P<0.01, * P<0.05. 
 
 Germany (835 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults, 
3 children 
Constant 0.99
*** 
(0.02) 
1.03*** 
(0.04) 
1.09*** 
(0.06) 
1.27*** 
(0.04) 
1.26*** 
(0.06) 
1.30*** 
(0.07) 
1.36*** 
(0.09) 
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
271.22*** 
(8.70) 
482.93*** 
(14.83) 
698.54*** 
(22.10) 
215.65*** 
(16.25) 
460.07*** 
(20.27) 
674.65*** 
(25.43) 
886.86*** 
(32.62) 
Dummy reference 
income 1,270 Euros 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Dummy reference 
income 2,032 Euros 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
Dummy reference 
income 2,794 Euros 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.24 0.46 0.53 0.54 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.30 
[0.83] 
0.30 
[0.82] 
0.22 
[0.88] 
0.87 
[0.46] 
0.54 
[0.66] 
0.46 
[0.71] 
0.22 
[0.88] 
 
 France (1,115 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults, 
3 children 
Constant 1.03
*** 
(0.03) 
1.07*** 
(0.05) 
1.08*** 
(0.07) 
1.26*** 
(0.04) 
1.26*** 
(0.06) 
1.25*** 
(0.08) 
1.24*** 
(0.10) 
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
234.33*** 
(10.56) 
437.75*** 
(17.86) 
621.02*** 
(25.08) 
202.54*** 
(14.63) 
411.23*** 
(19.94) 
604.04*** 
(26.93) 
786.70*** 
(34.67) 
Dummy reference 
income 1,312 Euros 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Dummy reference 
income 2,100 Euros 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
Dummy reference 
income 2,887 Euros 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.20 0.35 0.39 0.40 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.43 
[0.73] 
0.36 
[0.78] 
0.26 
[0.85] 
0.21 
[0.89] 
0.16 
[0.92] 
0.05 
[0.98] 
0.04 
[0.99] 
 
 Cyprus (650 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults, 
3 children 
Constant 1.08
*** 
(0.05) 
1.19*** 
(0.09) 
1.28*** 
(0.14) 
1.24*** 
(0.07) 
1.31*** 
(0.10) 
1.43*** 
(0.14) 
1.52*** 
(0.17) 
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
192.68*** 
(9.22) 
351.77*** 
(15.89) 
519.77*** 
(23.82) 
168.68*** 
(12.35) 
321.83*** 
(16.84) 
499.02*** 
(23.29) 
661.18*** 
(29.20) 
Dummy reference 
income 774 Euros 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
Dummy reference 
income 1,238 Euros 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
Dummy reference 
income 1,702 Euros 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.30 0.45 0.49 0.52 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.76 
[0.52] 
0.73 
[0.53] 
0.76 
[0.52] 
0.15 
[0.93] 
0.26 
[0.85] 
0.30 
[0.82] 
0.40 
[0.75] 
 
Table 3 (continued). 
 India (1,070 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults, 
3 children 
Constant 1.09
*** 
(0.10) 
1.25*** 
(0.15) 
1.39*** 
(0.22) 
1.19*** 
(0.11) 
1.19*** 
(0.16) 
1.32*** 
(0.22) 
1.31*** 
(0.29) 
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
110.65*** 
(6.69) 
200.92*** 
(9.67) 
308.39*** 
(14.48) 
134.11*** 
(7.39) 
245.18*** 
(10.72) 
357.38*** 
(14.45) 
467.95*** 
(18.95) 
Dummy reference 
income 552 Euros 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.00 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.12) 
Dummy reference 
income 967 Euros 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
Dummy reference 
income 1,381 Euros 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.38 0.39 0.31 0.42 0.46 0.47 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.15 
[0.93] 
0.07 
[0.97] 
0.08 
[0.97] 
0.15 
[0.93] 
0.07 
[0.98] 
0.09 
[0.96] 
0.05 
[0.99] 
 
 China (980 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults, 
3 children 
Constant 1.47
*** 
(0.11) 
1.67*** 
(0.22) 
1.93*** 
(0.37) 
1.49*** 
(0.12) 
1.80*** 
(0.20) 
2.13*** 
(0.31) 
2.68*** 
(0.44) 
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
139.39*** 
(8.09) 
295.82*** 
(16.83) 
411.41*** 
(27.73) 
78.42*** 
(9.27) 
227.80*** 
(15.01) 
386.69*** 
(23.30) 
529.31*** 
(33.52) 
Dummy reference 
income 497 Euros 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.17 
(0.11) 
Dummy reference 
income 993 Euros 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.19* 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.16* 
(0.08) 
-0.23* 
(0.12) 
Dummy reference 
income 1,987 Euros 
0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.16 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.09 
(0.05) 
-0.15 
(0.09) 
-0.19 
(0.12) 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.15 0.29 0.32 0.29 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.32 
[0.81] 
0.24 
[0.87] 
1.56 
[0.20] 
0.56 
[0.64] 
1.10 
[0.35] 
1.68 
[0.17] 
1.75 
[0.16] 
 
 Botswana (477 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults, 
3 children 
Constant 1.40
*** 
(0.15) 
1.56*** 
(0.28) 
1.61*** 
(0.44) 
1.15*** 
(0.24) 
1.47*** 
(0.31) 
1.56*** 
(0.43) 
1.75*** 
(0.59) 
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
115.85*** 
(9.75) 
233.90*** 
(17.48) 
351.55*** 
(26.97) 
122.06*** 
(14.57) 
249.05*** 
(19.01) 
388.31*** 
(26.73) 
527.51*** 
(36.21) 
Dummy reference 
income 381 Euros 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.18 0.33 0.38 0.38 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.69 
[0.41] 
0.68 
[0.41] 
0.63 
[0.43] 
0.01 
[0.91] 
0.02 
[0.88] 
0.08 
[0.78] 
0.01 
[0.93] 
 
 
Figure 1.   Scatter plots of stated EIs in  
Part A of the survey for each RI and  
each family type.  
         6th degree polynomial fit. 
         linear regression. 
 
 
 
1 adult, 1child
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
reference income
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 in
co
m
e
1 adult, 2 children
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
reference income
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 in
co
m
e
1 adult, 3 children
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
reference income
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 in
co
m
e
2 adults, 3 children
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
reference income
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 in
co
m
e
2 adults, 2 children
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
reference income
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 in
co
m
e
2 adults, 1 child
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
reference income
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 in
co
m
e
2 adults, 0 children
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
reference income
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 in
co
m
e
Figure 2. Scatter plots of stated  
equivalent incomes. 
6th degree polynomial fit 
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Figure 3. Scatter plots of stated  
equivalent incomes. 
6th degree polynomial fit 
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1. Appendix A - Common Choice-Independent Rates of Time
Preference and Time-Invariant Momentary Utility Functions
Household preferences of each i 2 I, are given by the general additively-separable utility
function with a common across households rate of time preference captured by the positively-
valued function  : R+ ! R++, where
U i
 
ci (t)

t0

=
Z 1
0
e 
R t
0 ()dui
 
ci (t)

dt . (1)
Assumption A.1 For all i 2 I, ui : R+ ! R, is twice-continuously di¤erentiable and
such that ui1 (c) > 0 and u
i
11 (c) < 0 on some interval, Ci  R+, with both ui1 (c) < 1 and
 1 < ui11 (c) for all c 2 Ci  R+,with ci  inf (Ci) < sup (Ci)  ci.
Assumption A.1 secures that, for all i 2 I, there is a choice domain, Ci  R+, which
is an interval, and where standard desirable properties of momentary utility functions are
present.
Assumption A.2 \
i2I
Ci is non-empty and not a singleton.
Assumption A.2 places a weak constraint on the scope of preference heterogeneity. It
says that nobodys bliss point (if any), should be lower than or equal to anyone elses
subsistence level of consumption (if any), hence \
i2I
Ci is an interval. Since the consumable
good is considered to be a composite good (a consumer basket), Assumption A.1 is not
unreasonably restrictive.
2
Theorem A.1 Under Assumptions A.1 and A.2, and Asumptions 2 and 3 in
the paper, a representative consumer exists if and only if
ui (c) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(c+i)
1  1 1
(1  1)
or
 e  1i c
with  > 0 and i 2 R or  < 0 and i > 0
with i > 0
,
(2)
for all i 2 I. The representative consumer has the common, across households,
rate of time preference,  (t), at all times, and momentary utility function given
by,
uRC (c) =
8><>:
(c+RC)
1  1 1
(1  1)
 e  1RC c
for  6= 0
else
, (3)
with
RC =
Z
I
id (i) .
Proof of Theorem A.1
Part 1: Necessity
Fix any function  : R+ ! R++, and any collection (ui)i2I , with properties complying
with Assumptions A.1 and A.2, and Assumption 2 in the paper. Assume that a representative
consumer exists with some momentary utility function vRC : CRCR+ ! R, of the form
vRC (c (t) ; t), at each point in time. Under Assumption 3 in the paper, from Denition 1
3
and the necessary condition,
_ci (t) =   u
i
1 (c
i (t))
ui11 (c
i (t))
[r (t)   (t)] , (4)
it must be,
vRC1
 R
I c
i (t) d (i) ; t

vRC11
 R
I c
i (t) d (i) ; t
 "r (t) + vRC12  RI ci (t) d (i) ; t
vRC1
 R
I c
i (t) d (i) ; t
# = Z
I
 (i)
ui1 (c
i (t))
ui11 (c
i (t))
di [r (t)   (t)] ,
(5)
in which the term
 v
RC
12
 R
I c
i (t) d (i) ; t

vRC1
 R
I c
i (t) d (i) ; t

is the temporal rate of time preference of the representative consumer.
(Necessity) Step 1: preliminary characterization of the function
R1
0
vRC (c (t) ; t) dt.
According to Denition 1 in the paper, the existence (and the implied preference prim-
itives) of the representative consumer should be independent from any price regime. The
case where r (t) =  (t) for all t  0, should always be included in the price domain. To see
this, x any moment in time, t 2 R+, pick any household i 2 I, and multiply its budget
constraint (this is equation (4) in the paper), by the integrating factor e 
R 
t r(s)ds, integrate
over all  2 [t;1), and apply the transversality condition, to obtain,Z 1
t
e 
R 
t r(s)dsci (t) d = ai (t) +
Z 1
t
e 
R 
t r(s)dsi ()w () d . (6)
For the case r (t) =  (t) for all t  0, under Assumption 3 in the paper, (4) implies that
_ci (t) = 0 for all t 2 R+, and all i 2 I, so, (6) implies that
ci (t) = c^i =
ai (t) +
R1
t
e 
R 
t (s)dsi ()w () dR1
t
e 
R 
t (s)dsd
, for all t  0. (7)
4
For the given preference prole, (ui)i2I , (7) implies that there are always
 
ai0; 
i

i2I and
(w (t))t0 securing that c^
i 2 Ci for all i 2 I, and for all t  0. So, the case r (t) =  (t) for
all t  0, is always part of the domain complying with Assumption 3 in the paper, for any
(ui)i2I that satises Assumptions A.1 and A.2, and also Assumption 2 in the paper.
Thus, set r (t) =  (t) for all t  0 and pick an appropriate  ai0; ii2I and (w (t))t0
securing that c^i > ci for all i 2 I, and for all t  0, and also set
c 
Z
I
c^id (i) .
Equations (5) and (7) imply that the necessary optimality conditions of the representative
consumer are,
 v
RC
12 (c; t)
vRC1 (c; t)
=  (t) .
So, standard Riemann integration with respect to t over the time interval [0; t] implies that
vRC1 (c; t) = e
  R t0 ()dvRC1 (c; 0) ,
or,
vRC (c; t) = e 
R t
0 ()dvRC (c; 0) ,
ignoring the constant, since this is a utility function. Setting
uRC (c)  vRC (c; 0) ,
we conclude that the objective of the representative consumer must be of the form
URC
 
(c (t))t0

=
Z 1
0
e 
R t
0 ()duRC (c (t)) dt . (8)
For notational ease, let fRC : CRC ! R++ and (f i : Ci ! R++) i2I , with
fRC () =  v
RC
1 ()
vRC11 ()
and f i () =   u
i
1 ()
ui11 ()
for all i 2 I.
5
Combining (8) with (5), it is,
fRC
Z
I
ci (t) d (i)

=
Z
I
f i
 
ci (t)

d (i) , (9)
for all (ci (t) 2 Ci)i2I that are consumer-equilibrium choices and t  0.
(Necessity) Step 2: characterization of fRC : R+ ! R++ and (f i : R+ ! R++) i2I . In this
step we show that,
(9),
8>>>><>>>>:
f i (c) = c+ i , and,
fRC (c) = c+
R
I id (i) ,
for some  2 R and some i 2 R, for all i 2 I
9>>>>=>>>>; . (10)
The su¢ ciency part of (10) is straightforward. For the necessity part of (10), let (9)
hold, being the only information available concerning fRC : R+ ! R++ and the collection
(f i : R+ ! R++) i2I . Suppose that r (t) =  (t) for all t  0, and, given (7), nd a common
distribution of
 
ai0; 
i

i2I and (w (t))t0, where a
i
0 = a0 and 
i = , so that ci (t) = ~c for all
i 2 I, and all t  0, also with ~c 2 \
i2I
Ci.
Let
RC (c)  fRC (c)  fRC (~c) , (11)
and,
i (c)  f i (c)  f i (~c) , for all i 2 I . (12)
For this distribution, (9) implies that,
fRC (~c) =
Z
I
f i (~c) d (i) . (13)
6
Given that inf fd (i) j i 2 I g > 0, set  such that,
0 <   inf fd (i) j i 2 I g . (14)
Pick any arbitrary household type i 2 I, keep prices as before, and modify the previous
distribution by adding to  of this household type di¤erent wealth or productivity that
yields ci (t) = (~c+c) 2 \
i2I
Ci, for all t  0. Since prices are the same, cj (t) = ~c, for all
j 2 In fig and for some households of type i with density d (i)   , and for all t  0.
Combining (9), (13), (11) and (12), it is,
RC
 
c+ ~c

= i (c+ ~c) . (15)
Since the choices of i 2 I, c, and ~c 2 \
i2I
Ci, were arbitrary, and since we can construct the
same distribution of consumption choices for all i 2 I, (15) holds for all i 2 I, so,
i (c) =  (c) for all c 2 \
i2I
Ci and for all i 2 I. (16)
Given (7), we are able to construct any interior optimal path with distribution of consump-
tions with ci (t) = c 2 \
i2I
Ci for all i 2 I, and all t  0. Therefore, (9), (13), and (16) imply
that,
RC (c) = i (c) =  (c) for all c 2 \
i2I
Ci and for all i 2 I , (17)
and,

Z
I
ci (t) d (i)

=
Z
I

 
ci (t)

d (i) , for all

ci (t) 2 \
i2I
Ci

i2I
, and t  0 , (18)
holding for the whole domain of wealth/labor-productivity heterogeneity and prices where
household choices fall in the interval \
i2I
Ci (see Assumption A.2) and are interior. Equation
(18) enables us to further characterize . In particular,
(18),  is a¢ ne on \
i2I
Ci. (19)
7
The su¢ ciency part of (19) is straightforward, so for the necessity part of (19) set,
zi  ci   ~c , (20)
with ~c dened as above for an arbitrary ~c 2 \
i2I
Ci, in the case where r (t) =  (t) for all
t  0. Since we know that for the transformed variable, z, the choice of 0 falls in the class
of interior solutions to a distribution in the domain of (ui)i2I , namely the case where all
households choose ~c 2 \
i2I
Ci at all times, x ~c and set,
	(z)   (z)   (0) . (21)
We now show that 	 is a linear functional. For any partition of households, irrespective
of their household types, say, I1; I2  I, with I1 \ I2 = ;, and
R
I1 d (i) = , retaining
r (t) =  (t) for all t  0, provide the same a0 and a labor-productivity function  to all
i 2 I1, so that consumption is equal to (c+ ~c) 2 \
i2I
Ci for all i 2 I1 at all times, provide to
the remaining households ~a0 and a labor-productivity ~, so that their consumption is equal
to ~c 2 \
i2I
Ci for all i 2 I2 at all times. Then, zi = c for all i 2 I1, and zi = 0 for all i 2 I2,
so,
 (c) =  (c+ (1  ) 0) ,
and (18) and (21) imply that,
 (c) =  (c) + (1  )  (0) ,
or,
	(c) = 	(c) . (22)
Notice that the choices of c and  were arbitrary. So, we can take any 1; 2 2 (0; 1) with
(1c+ ~c) ; (1c+ ~c) 2 \
i2I
Ci and 2
1
=  2 R+. Repeating the same steps, (22) yields
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	(1c) = 1	(c) and 	(1c) = 1	(c), or,
	(1c) = 	(1c) , for all  2 R+ . (23)
Since 	 is a univariate function, (23) is su¢ cient to prove that 	 is linear. So, let,
	(z) = z ,  2 R,
and, due to the linearity of 	, the transformation (20) can be ignored, having (21) and (17)
implying that,  (c) = c+(0). But since (11) and (12) imply that  (~c) = 0,  (0) =  ~c,
so,
RC (c) = i (c) =  (c) = c  ~c ,  2 R, for all c 2 \
i2I
Ci and for all i 2 I . (24)
Using (24) we show that,
i (c) =  (c) = c  ~c ,  2 R, for all c 2 Ci and for all i 2 I . (25)
To prove (25), consider the case where an arbitrary cj 2 Cj is such that cj  inf

\
i2I
Ci

or cj  sup

\
i2I
Ci

for some j 2 I, whenever any of the two is possible (i.e., whenever
inf

\
i2I
Ci

> 0, or sup

\
i2I
Ci

<1). There always exists some  2 (0; 1), with   d (j),
such that (cj + (1  ) ~c) 2 \
i2I
Ci. So, retaining r (t) =  (t) for all t  0, provide a level a0
and a labor-productivity function  to a mass  of type j 2 I, so that consumption is equal
to cj at all times, and also provide to the remaining households ~a0 and a labor-productivity
~, so that their consumption is equal to ~c 2 \
i2I
Ci at all times. Combining (9), (11), (12)
and (13), it is
j
 
cj

= RC
 
cj + (1  ) ~c .
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But since (cj + (1  ) ~c) 2 \
i2I
Ci, (24) implies thatRC (cj + (1  ) ~c) =  (cj + (1  ) ~c) 
~c, or
j
 
cj

= cj   ~c .
Since the choices of j 2 I and cj 2 Cj were arbitrary, (25) is proved.
Combining (12) with (25) it is,
f i (c) = c  ~c+ f i (~c) for all c 2 Ci and all i 2 I . (26)
Now that all f is are completely characterized over their domains, Ci, we can consider the
case of c = 0, irrespective from whether 0 2 Ci or not, in order to set the intercepts of all
f is. Equation (26) implies,
f i (~c) = ~c+ f i (0) . (27)
Setting f i (0) = i for some i 2 R, for all i 2 I, a nal combination of (26) with (27), and
also setting RC =
R
I id (i) (consistently with (9)), completes the proof of (10).
(Necessity) Step 3: characterization of (ui : R+ ! R) i2I and uRC : R+ ! R.
In light of (10), we derive the functional forms of utility for all household types through
Riemann integration. There are two general cases, those of  6= 0 and  = 0. (The case
where  = 1 is also of special interest, but the particular functional form of (ui)i2I and u
RC
that result in this case can be derived from the more general functional forms that apply to
 6= 0.)
For the case where  6= 0, (10) implies that,
ui11 (c)
ui1 (c)
=   1
c+ i
, (28)
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and the indenite Riemann integral of this expression with respect to c yields,
ln

ui1 (c)

=   1

ln (c+ i) + i , (29)
where i is some constant in R, that can be household-specic, and integrating once more,
it is,
ui (c) = ei
(c+ i)
1  1


 
1  1

 +  , (30)
where  is, again some constant. Setting ei = 1, without loss of generality, and  accord-
ingly, we obtain the result of (2). The special case where  = 1, is known to yield the result
that ui (c) = ln (c+ i)+, through computing the limit of the above expression for ! 1
using LHôpitals rule. The preferences of the representative consumer are derived in the
same way.
For the case where  = 0,
ui11 (c)
ui1 (c)
=   1
i
, (31)
and in order for ui1 > 0 and u
i
11 < 0 to hold, it must be that i > 0. So,
ln

ui1 (c)

=   1
i
c+ i , (32)
and
ui (c) =  eiie 
1
i
c
+  , (33)
so, setting eii = 1 and  = 0 yields the corresponding function in (2). With the same
reasoning for the representative consumer, the proof of the necessity part is complete.
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Part 2: Su¢ ciency
The particular functional forms given by (2) enable a complete analytical characterization
of the demand functions of all households at all times. Again, two cases must be examined
separately, that of  6= 0 and the case where  = 0.
Under the assumption that  6= 0, (4), implies
_ci (t) =

ci (t) + i

[r (t)   (t)] ,
so, multiplying this expression by the integrating factor e 
R 
t [r(s) (s)]ds and integrating over
the interval [t;  ] for any  2 [t;1), yields
ci () = ci (t) e
R 
t [r(s) (s)]ds + ie

R 
t [r(s) (s)]ds
Z 
t
e 
R 
t [r(s) (s)]ds [r (s)   (s)] ds .
Multiplying this last expression by e 
R 
t r(s)ds, integrating over all  2 [t;1), and combining
the result with (6), gives
ci (t) =
ai (t) +
R1
t
e 
R 
t r(s)dsi ()w () dR1
t
e
R 
t [( 1)r(s) (s)]dsd
 i
R1
t
e
R 
t [( 1)r(s) (s)]ds
R 
t
e 
R 
t [r(s) (s)]ds [r (s)   (s)] dsdR1
t
e
R 
t [( 1)r(s) (s)]dsd
, (34)
which can be linearly aggregated across all ais, is and is, proving that a representative
consumer exists, as long as Assumption A.1 holds, which keeps all individual demands taking
the form of (34).
For the case where  = 0, when all individual utilities fall in the class of ui (c) =  e  1i c,
(34) implies that,
ci (t) =
ai (t) +
R1
t
e 
R 
t r(s)dsi ()w () d   i
R1
t
e 
R 
t r(s)ds
R 
t
[r (s)   (s)] dsdR1
t
e 
R 
t r(s)dsd
, (35)
which can also be linearly aggregated across all ais, is and is, completing the proof of
the theorem. Q.E.D.
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Theorem A.1 states that the existence of a representative consumer rests upon partic-
ular functional forms and common parameter values: the quasi elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, , should be the same across all households;1 households can di¤er only with
respect to their subsistence consumption or bliss point of consumption; yet, it can either
be that all households have some subsistence consumption, or that all households can have
some bliss point, but bliss points and consumption subsistence levels cannot coexist in the
same community preference prole.
1 Note that the elasticity of substitution is equal to   (1  i=c).
13
2. Appendix B - Samples
2.1 Representative research sample for Germany
In order to implement Part A of the questionnaire e¢ ciently, it is necessary to examine
demographic and descriptive income statistics from the country being studied in order to
determine appropriate household types and reference incomes (RIs) to use in Part A. In Ger-
many, the eight household types that were chosen represent 86.05% of the overall number of
households, as seen in Table B1, based on the most recent German Income and Expenditure
Survey (EVS) of 2003.2 The EVS, provided by the German Statistical O¢ ce in ve-year
intervals, contains representative household-level information on income, wealth, and expen-
ditures for several types of goods. The RIs provided in Part A were determined so as to cover
a broad range of the disposable-income distribution for single-childless-adult households in
Germany. The amount of EUR 500 per month is the level of total social assistance for a
one-member household in Germany. Specically, the level of monetary social assistance in
2006 for a single, childless adult is EUR 345 per month (see Article 20, Paragraph 2, 2a,
3, Sozialgesetzbuch II (SGB II - Social Security Code)).3 In addition, households re-
ceive housing allowances. The level of housing allowances is contingent upon the rent and
also upon the income and wealth of the single, childless adult. A reasonable number is ca.
EUR 160. The amount of EUR 1,250 corresponds to the 41st percentile of the one-member-
household monthly disposable-income distribution, EUR 2,000 to the 76th, EUR 2,750 to
the 89th, and EUR 3,500 to the 94th percentile. Each respondent was provided with only
one RI to evaluate in Part A (by random assignment).
The surveys sample consists of 2,042 respondents from all regions of Germany, col-
2 See the German Social Science Infrastructure Services at:
http://www.gesis.org/en/social_monitoring/GML/data/inc&exp/index.htm.
3 For the German Social Security Code see, http://www.sozialgesetzbuch-
bundessozialhilfegesetz.de/_buch/sgb_ii.htm.
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lected by the research institute FORSA(Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistis-
che Analysen mbH - Research Institute for Social Research and Statistical Analyses) in
2006. The FORSA institute routinely conducts surveys with a representative online panel
of about 10,000 German households. FORSA has stored an extensive set of socioeconomic
and demographic variables for each participating household. This enables a pre-screening
of respondentspersonal and household characteristics. Households were provided with web
TVs when Internet was not available. Completion times ranged from about 10 to 25 minutes.
The sampling procedure is designed to obtain enough respondents who live in each of
the household types that appear as hypothetical households in Part A. Table B2 shows
the breakdown of the large sample from Germany, and Table B3 shows the number of
respondents from each family type. Table B3 also compares the percentages of respondents
from each household type in the sample with the percentages of household types in the overall
German population. This comparison reveals that pre-screening of respondent characteristics
is e¢ cient. The household type consisting of one adult with three children is more than six
times over-represented in the sample relative to the German population. Even so, there were
only 19 respondents from households with one adult and three children. For the other seven
household types, respondent numbers are su¢ ciently high to conduct the tests explained
below.
2.2 Pilot Survey Samples
The breakdown of the samples in pilot studies appears in Tables B5a and B5b. The com-
plete questionnaire appears in Appendix A.1 of Koulovatianos et al. (2005). In Botswana,
the questionnaire consisted of questions about three reference incomes instead of ve. Be-
cause several languages (mainly Setswana and Kalanga, but also Sekgalagadi) are used in
Botswana, interviewers had to resort to oral interviews. The response rate with ve refer-
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ence incomes was low, and given our planned budget and time constraints we modied the
questionnaire so as to increase the response rate. For the purpose of testing the income
dependence of equivalence scales, three reference incomes serve this task well. For testing
the linear relationship between EIs and RIs, three reference incomes are marginally su¢ -
cient for such a test. Nevertheless, we include this country in this study as complementary
information.
The questionnaire, the sampling strategy and sampling regions for Germany, France, and
Cyprus appear in previous studies (see Koulovatianos et al. (2005, 2007)). The sampling
region in China was the urban area of Hangzhou and several towns in the province of Zhe-
jiang. In India, the sample was collected from cities and villages of three states of south
India, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka. The cities where our respondents were
surveyed are Chennai (Madras) in Tamil Nadu, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), and Banga-
lore in Karnataka. The questionnaire was provided in the languages of Tamil (Tamil Nadu),
Telegu (Andhra Pradesh), in the English language (respondents from Karnataka preferred
English instead of our questionnaires provided in the language Kannada) and elderly respon-
dents were given the option of a questionnaire in Hindi. In Botswana, sampling was from
the capital Gaborone and villages around it. Apart from questionnaires provided in English,
a large part of the respondents were interviewed orally, mainly in the languages Setswana
and Kalanga. Sample surveys typically lasted between 20-35 minutes, as respondents had
to evaluate ve di¤erent RIs.
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3. Appendix C How NLSE suppresses noise from Heterogeneity
in Respondent Perceptions of Verbal Characterizations
The existence of a common, cardinalperception of verbal characterizations such as good
or bad is not guaranteed.4 This problem can make stated Likert-scale values in Part B
noisy across individuals. We have named the source of such noise Heterogeneity in Respon-
dent Perceptions of Verbal Characterizations (HRPVC). To suppress such inter-respondent
noise, we construct the variable normalized Likert-scale evaluation(NLSE).
Table C1 presents the descriptive statistics of Likert-scale values stated in Part B for
all household types and RIs. The means and medians across household types for a given
reference income are close to each other. This lends support to the results of the pilot survey
that was run in advance to dene the EIs that were provided in Part B:5 respondents to
the present survey also perceive the average incomes stated by the respondents of the pilot
survey as EIs.
Figure C1 depicts information from the rst column of Table C1, which refers to the
one-member household. Each box in Figure C1 is dened by the value of the rst and third
quartile, so each box contains 50% of the values around the median. A dash within a box
represents the median response, while each vertical line spans the range of responses. Except
for RI = EUR 2,750, the range of responses covers the whole Likert-scale interval that was
provided (from 1 to 100). In particular, for the distribution of responses corresponding to
RI = EUR 1,250, both the mean and the median lie in the middle of the range, and the two
middle quartiles are distanced symmetrically from the median by 20 points in the Likert
scale. So, while Figure C1 shows that there is positive correlation between income and
4 See Kahneman and Krueger (2006, pp. 18-21) for a thorough discussion of this di¢ culty of inter-respondent
comparisons of verbal characterizations of well-being.
5 These numbers are taken from Koulovatianos et al. (2005) for Germany.
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subjective perceptions of living standards, the noisiness of the Likert-scale values indicates
the presence of HRPVC. Such noisiness justies concerns about the e¤ectiveness of using
rawLikert-scale values for interpersonal comparisons and about their role as conditioning
variables in regressions.
The descriptive statistics of NLSE are given in Table C2 and Figures C2 to C6. By the
denition of NLSE, noise stemming from HRPVC should be suppressed. Table C2 conrms
this suppressive e¤ect of the NLSE.
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4. Appendix D Calibration of the Representative Consumer in
Germany in year 2003
In order to calibrate subsistence consumption so as to replicate the numbers appearing in
the utility function given by (18) in the paper, we combine equation (15) in the paper with
equation (27) appearing in the papers Appendix under the Assumptions of Proposition 1,
and we obtain,
j =  i;j  i     i;j . (D.1)
Setting i = OMH, where OMHdenotes a one-member household, and aggregating across
all household types, equation (D.1) implies,X
j2I
jj = OMH 
X
j2I
j OMH;j    
X
j2I
jOMH;j , (D.2)
where j is the fraction of households belonging to household type j 2 I, in order to obtain
the term RC (t) given by equation (11) in the text for year 2003. Data for the vector
j
	
j2I in equation (D.2) is taken from Table B3 of Appendix B, which are taken from
the 2003 German Income and Expenditure Survey. Estimates for the vectors

 OMH;j
	
j2I
and

OMH;j
	
j2I are taken from the relevant estimated coe¢ cients in Table 1 of the paper,
while  OMH;OMH = 1, and OMH;OMH = 0. Since the estimation appearing in Table 1 of
the paper refers to monthly data, we have multiplied the resulting expression for j2Ijj
from equation (D.2) by 12, in order to obtain the utility function referring to one year.
Similarly, regarding the case of exponential utility, equation (32) in the paper imply that,X
j2I
jj = OMH 
X
j2I
j OMH;j ,
so, together with equation (11) in the paper we obtain equation (19) in the paper.
In aggregative models that use the utility function given by (18) in the paper, the appro-
priate measure of aggregate income to use is one-member-household equivalent income. A
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distribution of one-member household equivalent incomes (DOMHEI) transforms household
income data referring to di¤erent household types into comparable incomes of identical (one-
member) households. Because these one-member-household EIs retain the original level of
material comfort of each individual, they reect the inequality of living standards among
individuals in a country.
The construction of a DOMHEI follows this procedure: consider the household income,
yh, of a household which is household type h with nh members; based on the estimated values
of coe¢ cients ah and bh in equation (17) in the paper, nd the RI that corresponds to yh,
denoted as yhRI ; assign y
h
RI to each household member of that household and include n
h times
the income level yhRI in the DOMHEI. The idea behind the construction of the DOMHEI is
to pick each household member from all household types and place him/her in a one-member
household (also treating children as adults), providing each individual with the same level of
material comfort in this (new) virtual household type as before. The income level yhRI plays
this role of making material-comfort levels equal when transforming all household types into
one-member households.
Our application appears in Figure D1. We have imposed an upper bound on equivalence
scales (ESs) equal to the number of household members. This constraint applies when
observed household incomes are exceptionally low. Table D1 presents the average ESs based
on estimates from Table 1 in the text, imputed in the income distribution for each household
type taken from the German Income and Expenditure Survey in year 2003. The expert-based
OECD-modied ESs are presented in the second column of Table D1.6 Our average ESs and
those of the OECD di¤er only slightly, justifying the comparison of the two estimates of
the DOMHEI appearing in Figure D1. The fact that our ESs fall with RI, shifts poorer
6 See the link in the OECD website:
http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,2546,en_2825_497118_35411112_1_1_1_1,00.html
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(richer) multi-member households to lower (higher) one-member-household EIs, thickening
the resulting density. This thickening impacts the inequality of one-member-household EIs
substantially: the Gini coe¢ cient increases from 27.37% (OECD ES) to 30.54% with our
ESs.
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Tables for Appendices A - D 
 
 
Table A1. Distribution of household types in Germany. Data refer to the overall population and are 
taken from the German Income and Expenditure Survey in 2003. 
 
 Household type 
1 adult,  
0 
children 
1 adult,  
1  
child 
1 adult,  
2 
children 
1 adult, 
3 
children 
2 adults, 
0 
children 
2 adults, 
1 
 child 
2 adults,  
2 
children 
2 adults,  
3  
children 
Other 
Number of 
households
(in 
thousands) 
14,031.1 931.4 356.3 45.4 11,208.4 2,440.9 2,963.2 808.3 5,312.8 
% of 
population  36.83 2.44 0.94 0.12 29.42 6.41 7.78 2.12 13.95 
 
 
Table A2. Description of the personal characteristics of the 2,042 respondents to the survey.  
a Respondents who have completed schooling sufficient for general qualification to enter a German 
University; b Respondents who stated that they have an occupation, and they either did not state their 
occupation type, or their occupation type did not fit into the other working categories;  
c Respondents who stated that they are non-working, and they either did not state their status, or their 
status did not fit into the other categories. 
 
 
 
Number of 
respondents 
% of 
respondents 
Region Former West Germany 1,541 75.5 
Former East Germany 501 24.5 
Gender Male 465 22.8 
Female 1,577 77.2 
Education No degree 42 2.1 
Basic level of schooling  (9 years) 587 28.7 
Secondary School 926 45.3 
Advanced technical college 119 5.8 
High School a 163 8.0 
Completed technical school or university 205 10.0 
Occupational Status Self-employed 43 2.1 
Civil servant 57 2.8 
White-collar 583 28.6 
Blue-collar 180 8.8 
In school or higher education/training 23 1.1 
Working, otherb 52 2.5 
Status of non-working Pensioner 327 16.0 
Unemployed 152 7.4 
Housewife/man 452 22.1 
Obligatory military / public service 101 4.9 
Non-working, otherc 72 3.5 
Family after-tax income 
class 
Less than 500 EUR 36 1.8 
Between 500 and 1000 euros 239 11.7 
Between 1,000 and 1,500 euros 385 18.9 
Between 1,500 and 2,000 euros 437 21.4 
Between 2,000 and 2500 euros 382 18.7 
Between 2,500 and 3,000 euros 242 11.9 
Between 3,000 and 3,500 euros 159 7.8 
Between 3,500 and 4,000 euros 68 3.3 
Between 4,000 and 4,500 euros 44 2.2 
4,500 euros or more 50 2.4 
Age group Between 18 and 40 years 863 42.3 
Between 40 and 60 years 831 40.7 
60 years or older 348 17.0 
Partner in the household Yes 1,396 68.4 
No 646 31.6 
Number of children in the 
household 
0 860 42.1 
1 521 25.5 
2 491 24.0 
3 or more 170 8.3 
 
Table A3. Distribution of household types of respondents in the survey sample (first two rows). The 
last row refers to the overall German population, using data from the most recent German Income and 
Expenditure Survey in 2003. Numbers appearing in the third row are percentages of the sum of 
households belonging to the eight household types presented in this table. 
 
 Household type 
1 adult,  
0 children 
1 adult, 
1 child 
1 adult, 
2 children 
1 adult, 
3 children 
2 adults, 
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults, 
3 children 
Number of respondents 445 125 57 19 415 396 434 151 
% of respondents 21.79 6.12 2.79 0.93 20.32 19.39 21.25 7.39 
% of population in 2003 42.80 2.84 1.09 0.14 34.19 7.45 9.04 2.47 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4. Distribution of respondents having an adjusted disposable household income that is similar 
to the reference income they were asked to evaluate in Part A of the questionnaire. The adjusted 
disposable household income is the disposable household income divided by the estimated 
equivalence scale for the respondent’s household type. The estimated equivalence scale is the 
average equivalence scale from responses to Part A. 
 
Respondent’s 
household type 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of overall 
sample 
Percentage of all 
respondents who belong to 
the same household type 
1 adult, 0 children 88 4.31 19.78 
1 adult, 1 child 26 1.27 20.80 
1 adult, 2 children 15 0.73 26.32 
1 adult, 3 children 5 0.24 26.32 
2 adults, no children 77 3.78 18.55 
2 adults, 1 child 77 3.78 19.44 
2 adults, 2 children 93 4.55 21.43 
2 adults, 3 children 34 1.67 22.52 
Table B1a. Breakdown of the samples in Germany, Cyprus, and France 
  Germany Cyprus France 
  
Sample: 167  
obs.  
Sample: 130 
obs.  
Sample: 223 
obs.  
  N % N % N % 
Gender Male 96 57.49 73 56.15 117 52.47 
 Female 71 42.51 57 43.85 106 47.53 
Partner in the 
household 
Yes 97 58.08 75 57.69 154 69.06 
No 70 41.92 55 42.31 69 30.94 
Living with 
parents 
Yes --- --- 37a 28.46 --- --- 
No --- --- 93 71.54 --- --- 
Number of 
children in the 
household 
 
0 123 73.65 82 63.08 102 45.74 
1 18 10.78 18 13.85 45 20.18 
2 15 8.98 23 17.69 46 20.63 
3 or more 11 6.59 7 5.38 30 13.45 
Family after-
tax income 
class 
 
 
1 32 19.16 9 6.92 18 8.07 
2 44 26.35 25 19.23 30 13.45 
3 37 22.16 24 18.46 41 18.39 
4 37 22.16 31 23.85 49 21.97 
5 17 10.18 41 31.54 85 38.12 
Occupational 
group 
Welfare recipient or 
unemployed 7 4.19 2 1.54 7 3.14 
Blue-collar worker 10 5.99 2 1.54 6 2.69 
 White-collar worker 83 49.70 40 30.77 48 21.52 
 Civil servant 13 7.78 40 30.77 29 13.00 
 
In school or higher 
education/training 34 20.36 30 23.08 102 45.74 
 Self-employed 7 4.19 13 10.00 13 5.83 
 Pensioner 10 5.99 0 0.00 6 2.69 
 Homemaker 3 1.80 3 2.31 12 5.38 
Education 
 
Below 9 years of 
education 1 0.60 4 3.08 0 0.00 
 
Completed extended 
Elementary school 21 12.57 8 6.15 13 5.83 
 
Completed special 
Secondary school 39 23.35 --- --- 43 19.28 
 
Completed secondary 
school 65 38.92 65 50.00 37 16.59 
 
Technical 
school/university degree 41 24.55 53b 40.77 130 58.30 
Number of 
siblings during 
childhood 
0 31 18.56 9 6.92 37 16.59 
1 55 32.93 34 26.15 72 32.29 
2 47 28.14 40 30.77 59 26.46 
 3 or more 34 20.36 47 36.15 55 24.66 
Note. The threshold of the first “family-after tax income class” is the country-specific poverty line for a single 
childless adult. Then, we add increments such that the mean of the third income class is approximately the 
mean household income in the respective country. The breakdown has already appeared in Koulovatianos et 
al. (2005). 
a One of the respondents who were living with their parents also had a partner and two children. 
b 14 out of the 53 highly educated respondents in Cyprus had finished a technical school (3 years of higher 
education). 
 
 
Table B1b. Breakdown of the samples in China, India, and Botswana 
  Botswana China India 
  
Sample: 159  
obs.  
Sample: 196 
obs.  
Sample: 214 
obs.  
  N % N % N % 
Gender Male 70 44.03 130 66.33 136 63.55 
 Female 89 55.97 66 33.67 78 36.45 
Partner in the 
household 
Yes 89 55.97 146 74.49 --- --- 
No 70 44.03 50 25.51 --- --- 
Number of 
adults in the 
household 
 
 
 
 
 
1 --- --- --- --- 12 5.61 
2 --- --- --- --- 73 34.11 
3 --- --- --- --- 35 16.36 
4 --- --- --- --- 56 26.17 
5 --- --- --- --- 22 10.28 
6 --- --- --- --- 10 4.67 
7 or more --- --- --- --- 6 2.80 
Number of 
children in 
the 
household 
0 48 30.19 159 81.12 74 34.58 
1 26 16.35 27 13.78 48 22.43 
2 40 25.16 7 3.57 62 28.97 
3 or more 45 28.30 3 1.53 30a 14.02 
Family after-
tax income 
class 
 
 
 
1 10 6.29 42 21.43 4 1.87 
2 18 11.32 47 23.98 22 10.28 
3 48 30.19 56 28.57 24 11.21 
4 42 26.42 32 16.33 39 18.22 
5 41 25.79 19 9.69 37 17.29 
6 --- --- --- --- 88 41.12 
Occupational 
group 
Welfare recipient or 
unemployed 30 18.87 4 2.04 8 3.74 
Blue-collar worker 19 11.95 11 5.61 26 12.15 
 White-collar worker 24 15.09 5 2.55 41 19.16 
 Civil servant 53 33.33 5 2.55 23 10.75 
 
In school or higher 
education/training 15 9.43 140 71.43 54 25.23 
 Self-employed 13 8.18 28 14.29 42 19.63 
 Pensioner 2 1.26 0 0.00 9 4.21 
 Homemaker 3 1.89 3 1.53 8 3.74 
 Agricultural worker --- --- --- --- 3 1.40 
Education No schooling --- --- 4 2.04 1 0.47 
 Basic schooling 5 3.14 16 8.16 3 1.40 
 Completed primary school 7 4.40 9 4.59 15 7.01 
 
Completed junior high 
school 21 13.21 13 6.63 44 20.56 
 Completed high school 39 24.53 147 75.00 93 43.46 
 
Technical 
school/university degree 87 54.72 7 3.57 58 27.10 
Number of 
siblings 
during 
childhood 
0 31 19.50 71 36.22 33 15.42 
1 20 12.58 58 29.59 52 24.30 
2 27 16.98 35 17.86 47 21.96 
3 or more 81 50.94 32 16.33 82 38.32 
Age group Less than 20 --- --- --- --- 49 22.90 
 Between 20 and 40 --- --- --- --- 127 59.35 
 40 or more --- --- --- --- 38 17.76 
Living area Urban 107 67.30 104 53.06 190 88.79 
 Rural 52 32.70 92 46.94 24 11.21 
Note. The threshold of the first “family-after tax income class” is the country-specific poverty line for a single 
childless adult. Then, we add increments such that the mean of the third income class is approximately the 
mean household income in the respective country.  
a In India. 8 households have 4 children. 2 households have 5 children, 3 households have 6 or more children. 
Table C1. Descriptive statistics of stated Likert-scale values. Number of respondents for each 
reference income: 428 (500 euros); 422 (1,250 euros); 385 (2,000 Euros); 402 (2,750 euros); 405 
(3,500 euros). 
  
Reference 
income 
 
Household type 
1 adult,  
0 children 
1 adult, 
1 child 
1 adult, 
2 children 
1 adult, 
3 children
2 adults, 
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults, 
3 children 
500  
euros 
 
 
 
Mean 17.60 20.03 22.58 23.43 24.37 24.43 24.96 27.38 
Median 10 10 15 15 20 20 20 20 
Std 19.77 19.76 19.87 20.37 21.14 20.98 21.54 23.18 
StdError 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.98 1.02 1.01 1.04 1.12 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
First Quartile 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Third Quartile 20 30 30 30 36 30 35 40 
1,250 
euros 
Mean 51.24 48.81 49.62 49.81 56.92 56.89 57.31 55.85 
Median 50 50 50 50 52.5 55 60 55 
Std 25.19 23.74 22.83 23.24 22.72 21.85 22.58 24.17 
StdError 1.23 1.16 1.11 1.13 1.11 1.06 1.10 1.18 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
First Quartile 30 30 30 30 40 40 40 40 
Third Quartile 70 68.75 68.75 70 70 70 70 70 
2,000 
euros 
Mean 73.76 68.42 66.99 63.37 77.18 75.73 74.70 72.70 
Median 80 70 70 65 80 80 80 75 
Std 23.74 22.77 22.47 23.14 19.84 19.35 19.98 22.31 
StdError 1.21 1.16 1.15 1.18 1.01 0.99 1.02 1.14 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
First Quartile 60 50 50 50 69 65 60 60 
Third Quartile 90 90 85 80 90 90 90 90 
2,750 
euros 
Mean 87.60 85.28 81.72 78.66 89.03 87.67 86.13 83.59 
Median 95 90 85 80 92.5 90 90 90 
Std 17.75 16.95 18.00 19.95 14.58 14.64 15.92 18.81 
StdError 0.89 0.85 0.90 0.99 0.73 0.73 0.79 0.94 
Min 10 15 20 10 20 40 30 15 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
First Quartile 80 80 70 70 80 80 80 70 
Third Quartile 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
3,500 
euros 
Mean 91.63 88.59 87.28 84.42 93.59 92.28 89.99 87.28 
Median 100 100 90 90 100 100 100 100 
Std 16.27 17.23 17.00 18.53 12.26 14.07 15.84 19.14 
StdError 0.81 0.86 0.84 0.92 0.61 0.70 0.79 0.95 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
First Quartile 90 80 80 75 90 90 87 80 
Third Quartile 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table C2. Descriptive statistics of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations. 
 
 
Reference 
income  
Household type 
1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult, 
2 children 
1 adult, 
3 children 
2 adults, 
0 children 
2 adults, 
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
500 
euros 
Mean 0.23 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.61 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.29 
Std 0.62 0.83 0.92 0.87 0.90 1.03 1.06 
StdError 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Min -1.79 -1.79 -2.08 -1.20 -1.79 -3.91 -2.30 
Max 3.00 3.91 4.09 3.91 3.91 4.09 4.25 
First Quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Third Quartile 0.41 0.69 0.84 0.69 0.69 1.10 1.10 
1,250 
euros 
Mean -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.12 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std 0.38 0.48 0.58 0.48 0.53 0.59 0.72 
StdError 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Min -1.61 -2.20 -2.64 -1.61 -2.20 -2.20 -4.50 
Max 2.30 3.00 3.40 3.69 3.40 3.91 4.09 
First Quartile -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 0.00 -0.11 -0.15 -0.18 
Third Quartile 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.34 
2,000 
euros 
Mean -0.06 -0.09 -0.17 0.08 0.07 0.05 -0.01 
Median 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std 0.26 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.58 
StdError 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Min -1.95 -1.95 -4.25 -2.20 -2.20 -2.20 -4.38 
Max 1.39 1.61 1.95 2.08 2.14 2.20 2.30 
First Quartile -0.15 -0.22 -0.34 -0.05 -0.11 -0.13 -0.21 
Third Quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 
2,750 
euros 
Mean -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.05 
Median 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std 0.14 0.21 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.38 
StdError 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Min -0.59 -0.85 -2.20 -0.92 -0.81 -1.10 -1.25 
Max 1.10 1.39 1.39 1.95 2.08 2.20 2.30 
First Quartile -0.06 -0.15 -0.22 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 -0.17 
Third Quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3,500 
euros 
Mean -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.19 0.23 0.36 
StdError 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Min -2.30 -0.92 -1.50 -0.69 -0.92 -1.32 -4.32 
Max 1.39 1.39 1.61 4.09 1.39 1.39 1.39 
First Quartile -0.05 -0.11 -0.16 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 
Third Quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Table D1. Average equivalence scales. Equivalence scale estimates taken from the regression in 
Table 1 in the text depend on the level of material comfort. These equivalence scale estimates are 
used to construct a distribution of one-member households’ equivalent incomes from the (most recent) 
German Income and Expenditure Survey in year 2003. The averages of the equivalence scales 
imputed in the German Income and Expenditure Survey income distribution (for each household type) 
are reported in the first column of this table. 
 
Household 
type 
Average 
equivalence scales 
from the estimates 
of the present 
study 
OECD-modified  
equivalence scale 
1 adult, 1 child 1.32 1.30 
1 adult, 2 children 1.55 1.60 
1 adult, 3 children 1.83 1.90 
2 adults, 0 children 1.64 1.50 
2 adults, 1child 1.83 1.80 
2 adults, 2 children 2.04 2.10 
2 adults, 3 children 2.29 2.40 
 
Figures for Appendices C and D 
 
Figure C1. Box plots of stated Likert-scale values for the reference household.  
 
 
 
Figure C2. Box plots of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations for different household types at a 
reference income of 500 euros. 
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Figure C3. Box plots of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations for different household types at a 
reference income of 1,250 euros. 
 
 
Figure C4. Box plots of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations for different household types at a 
reference income of 2,000 euros.  
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Figure C5. Box plots of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations for different household types at a 
reference income of 2,750 euros. 
 
 
Figure C6. Box plots of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations for different household types at a 
reference income of 3,500 euros. 
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Normalized Likert-scale evaluations, reference income = 3,500 euros
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Figure D1. Distribution of one-member-household equivalent incomes calculated using the OECD-
modified equivalence scales and equivalence-scale estimates taken from the regressions in Table 1 
from the present survey. Household-income data are taken from the 2003 German Income and 
Expenditure Survey. 
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Appendix E 
 
Survey Instrument 
Documentation 
  
Information on the connection between a household’s demographic composition and 
the level of material comfort that its income can buy for its members is important for 
researchers in diverse disciplines. This survey instrument is designed to obtain direct 
estimates of this connection from respondents.  
 
The survey was implemented in automated and electronic form by a professional 
research institute, the FORSA Research Institute for Social Research and Statistical 
Analysis (“Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistische Analysen mbH”). Each 
participating household was equipped with a “set-top box” that provided Internet 
access and that was linked to the household’s television set.  
 
An introduction addressed to respondents provides a short explanation of the survey 
topic and a clarification of the concepts that follow. The actual questionnaire consists 
of two Parts, Part A and Part B. Part A contains the main evaluation task: to provide 
incomes that equalize the level of material comfort across different hypothetical 
household types. Part B poses the same assessment problem as in Part A, but using 
a different means of communication. Respondents are asked to assess the material 
comfort of different hypothetical household types with specific income levels on Likert 
scales.  
 
Key advantages of the survey instrument: 
• Direct assessments of incomes that equalize the level of material comfort of 
different household types, enabling the quantification of household-size 
economies. 
• Posing the same evaluation problem using different means of communication in 
Parts A and B allows for a test of the effectiveness of the survey instrument, 
suggested in Part A. 
• Relevance of the main evaluation task with observable characteristics of the 
respondent enables a test of effectiveness of the survey instrument. The socio-
economic and demographic composition of the respondent’s household may limit 
her/his available information and ability to evaluate hypothetical household types 
and levels of material comfort, thus contaminating the results due to a limited 
information bias. Comparing answers from respondents whose socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics are close to those of the hypothetical 
households they examine with answers from all other respondents enables a test 
for limited-information bias. 
•  Low respondent burden: respondents can complete the questionnaire 
(Introduction, Parts A and B) in about 10-25 minutes. 
• High flexibility: Parts A and B can be adjusted easily so as to encompass other 
hypothetical household types and levels of material comfort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Introduction for the 
respondents 
  
Purpose of the survey 
In general, different household types may need different incomes in order to attain 
the same level of material comfort. Since assessing such incomes in an objective 
way is difficult, we would like to ask you for your personal evaluation of these 
incomes for a number of different household types. Please note that in this 
questionnaire there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. Your answers should only 
reflect your personal judgements. 
 
 
[Technical note to the researcher. Respondents click a button to switch to the next 
screen.] 
 
 
Instruction 
You will frequently read the expression “monthly net household income.” Such a 
“monthly net household income” is the income amount a household has at its 
disposal after paying taxes and social security contributions (health insurance 
contributions, compulsory long term care insurance contributions, unemployment 
insurance contributions, and contributions to the pension system).  
 
“Monthly net household income” encompasses: 
Salary and earnings, 
Income from self-employment, 
Pensions, 
Unemployment benefits and social benefits, 
Accommodation allowance, 
Child allowances, 
Incomes from rent and lease, and  
Other incomes such as returns on investment, interest, etc. 
 
 
[Technical note to the researcher. Respondents click a button to go to the next 
screen.] 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART  
A 
  
Now, please think about a situation where a single, childless adult has a monthly net 
household income of 500 euros.  
 
In this survey, there are seven other household types: 
with 1 adult and 1 child 
with 1 adult and 2 children 
with 1 adult and 3 children 
with 2 adults and no children 
with 2 adults and 1 child 
with 2 adults and 2 children 
with 2 adults and 3 children 
 
Assume that adults are ages 35 to 55 and children are ages 7 to 11. 
 
 
[Technical note to the researcher. Respondents click a button to go to the next 
screen.] 
 
 
What monthly net household income would each of these seven household types 
need in order to attain the same level of material comfort as the single-childless- 
adult household with a monthly net household income of 500 euros? 
 
You should state this monthly net household income for each household type in the 
table that will follow on the next screen. Please note that your answers should reflect 
only your personal judgements. 
 
 
[Technical note to the researcher. Respondents click a button to go to the next 
screen.] 
 
  
What monthly net household income would each household type need in order to 
attain the same level of material comfort as the single-childless-adult household with 
the monthly net household income of 500 euros? 
 
Please state income amounts in euros. 
 
1 adult without children 500 euros 
1 adult, 1 child  
1 adult, 2 children  
1 adult, 3 children  
2 adults, no children  
2 adults, 1 child  
2 adults, 2 children  
2 adults, 3 children  
 
 
[Technical note to the researcher. The reference income level provided in the table is 
randomly assigned to the respondents. If a respondent does not report an income 
amount for a household type, there is a reminder: “Please fill in income amounts in all 
empty cells of the table.” If a respondent’s entries are not numbers, there is a 
reminder: “Please state numbers only.” If a respondent states income amounts that 
are decreasing inversely with household size, a box opens: “Usually, larger 
household types also need higher incomes in order to attain a specific living 
standard. Please, make sure that you are not stating how much income should be 
added compared to a smaller household type, but how much the total net household 
income should be. Please, make sure that the entries you made are indeed total net 
household incomes.” This box opens only once, and its intention is to reduce 
misunderstandings by respondents. However, if a respondent did not adjust the 
entries she/he made in the table, she/he was free to do so. Respondents click a 
button to go to the next screen.] 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART  
B 
  
We will show you several household types with a given monthly net household 
income. Please evaluate the material comfort that these monthly net household 
incomes bring to the different household types on a scale ranging from 1 to 100 
points. The values in this scale stand for the following:  
 
 
 
 
Please complete the following table by evaluating the monthly net income of each 
household type on the scale of 1-100. 
 
All values between 1 and 100 are permissible. 
 
 Level of 
material 
comfort 
(in points) 
1 adult, no children with 3,500 euros  
1 adult, 1 child with 3,900 euros  
1 adult, 2 children with 4,200 euros  
1 adult, 3 children with 4,550 euros  
2 adults, no children with 4,850 euros  
2 adults, 1 child with 5,250 euros  
2 adults, 2 children with 5,550 euros  
2 adults, 3 children with 5,850 euros  
 
[Technical note to the researcher. The numbers provided in this table are estimates 
of average equivalent incomes for five reference income levels from an independent 
study. The five reference incomes are the same as the reference income levels in 
Part A. So, altogether, five profiles of equivalent incomes (including a reference 
income for the single-childless-adult household) were evaluated by the survey 
sample, one profile per respondent. One out of these five equivalent-income profiles 
was randomly assigned to a respondent. If a respondent reports less than eight Likert 
scale values, there is a reminder: “Please fill in all empty cells of the table.” If a 
respondent’s answers do not fall in the given range of the Likert scale (1-100), there 
is a reminder to “please state numbers between 1 and 100 only.”] 
 
 
10 50 30 1 70 100 90 
very bad bad sufficient good very good 
Level of material comfort 
